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STANDING TO CHALLENGE GOVERNMENTAL ACTION
KENNETH CULP DAvIs*
§ 1. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
The five major questions about judicial review of administrative
action are whether, when, for whom, how, and how much judicial
review should be provided. The question of who may challenge ad-
ministrative action-the third of the five major questions-is cus-
tomarily discussed by courts in terms of "standing" to challenge.
The problem of standing merges with and often seems to overlap
the problems of whether and when administrative action may be
reviewed. For instance, when the party who challenges administra-
tive action has better standing than any other party, a holding that
the challenging party lacks standing is the equivalent of a holding
of unreviewability; this was true, for instance, in the important
case of Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co." The overlap of the problem
of standing with the problem of when administrative action may be
challenged-the problems of ripeness and of exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies-is even more common. The same case often
involves a single problem which is made up of elements of "standing
and ripeness"--elements involving both the qualification of the
plaintiff and the timing of the challenge. For instance, when the
Attorney General added to his subversive list the name of the Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, the question whether the Com-
mittee could challenge the Attorney General's action before the sub-
versive list was used in any adjudication involved a problem of
both the timing of the challenge and the standing of the Committee. 2
In Eccles v. Peoples BankV the Court refused to review the validity
of a condition under which the bank became a member of the Fed-
*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
This article is the product of an effort to broaden and to deepen Chapter 16
of Davis, Administrative Law (1951). A companion article on the closely re-
lated subject of Ripeness of Governmental Action for Judicial Review will
soon be published in the Harvard Law Review.
1. 310 U. S. 113 (1940).
2. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123(1951).
3. 333 U. S. 426 (1948).
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eral Reserve System, largely because the Court thought the ques-
tion whether the Board would ever invoke the condition was too
speculative; the case can be explained in terms of lack of ripeness
or in terms of lack of standing of the bank until the bank is more
immediately affected.
One who is seriously harmed by reviewable administrative action
which is illegal or even unconstitutional is often denied judicial re-
view on account of lack of standing. The law of standing is funda-
mentally artificial to the extent that one who is in fact harmed by
administrative action is held to lack standing to challenge the legali-
ty of the action. The artificiality-frequently running counter to
natural instincts of judges-results in a complexity that is so great
that the Supreme Court often violates the principles that the Court
has laid down for its own guidance.4 The Supreme Court has re-
cently referred to the law of standing as a "complicated specialty of
federal jurisdiction."5 The federal law of standing is undeniably
"complicated." But since all courts must determine what parties
should be allowed to challenge governmental action, the law of
standing is no more a specialty of federal jurisdiction than it is a
specialty of state law.
Only in one sense is the law of standing a specialty of federal
jurisdiction. Speaking very broadly, the state courts that have con-
structed their own doctrine independently of the federal doctrine
have usually tended toward the simpler, less artificial, and more
satisfactory idea that anyone who is in fact substantially injured by
administrative action has standing to challenge it. The federal law
of standing is a "specialty of federal jurisdiction" only to the extent
that it involves artificialities that the state courts have refused to
adopt.
Because the law of standing to challenge administrative action
is only a part of a broader body of law involving standing to chal-
lenge governmental action, we include in our discussion some of
the germinal cases on standing to challenge the constitutionality of
legislative action.
§ 2. "ADvERsELY AFFECTED IN FACT" AS A GUIDE
A court which holds that one who is in fact adversely affected by
governmental action lacks standing to challenge that action is in
effect saying something like this: "We don't deny that you are hurt
by the governmental action you challenge. We don't deny that the
4. See the summary in section 18, below.
5. United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U. S. 153, 156 (1953).
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action may be illegal. We don't deny that we are assigned the job of
providing relief against illegal governmental action of the type here
involved. But even though you are hurt, you are not deserving of
relief."
Our central question is: What circumstances, if any, can justify
such a holding by a court?
The circumstances that will justify such a holding have to relate
to the standing of the plaintiff, and not to the question of review-
ability or unreviewability. In other words, to focus upon the law
of standing, we must assume that a legislative or judicial deter-
mination has previously been made that the particular type of
governmental action should be subject to review. Our question is:
When, if ever, should a plaintiff who is in fact hurt by reviewable
governmental action be denied review for lack of standing?
The reasons in favor of permitting a challenge of governmental
action by one who is in fact adversely affected by that action are
very powerful. The strongest reason is the principle of elementary
justice that one who is in fact hurt by illegal action should have a
remedy. The second reason is that the artificiality and complexity
of the law of standing would disappear if the courts would follow
the simple idea that one who is in fact hurt may challenge; the large
amount of litigation over the unnecessary complexities of the law
of standing is wasteful. The third reason, applicable in the federal
system, lies in the intent behind the Administrative Procedure Act.
The APA provides in section 10: "Except so far as (1) statutes
preclude review or (2) agency action is by law committed to agency
discretion-(a) Right of Review.-Any person suffering legal
wrong because of any agency action, or adversely affected or ag-
grieved by such action within the meaning of any relevant statute,
shall be entitled to judicial review thereof."
Although the legislative history is not entirely free from con-
flicting views, the part of the legislative history that is both clear
and authoritative is the statement made by the committees of both
the Senate and the House, identical in both reports: "This sub-
section confers a right of review upon any person adversely affected
in fact by agency action or aggrieved within the meaning of any
statute." O
When both committee reports are so clear in translating the
statutory words "adversely affected" to mean "adversely affected
in fact," the reasons in favor of following that interpretation are
rather powerful, except to the extent that other legislative history
6. Sen. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 212, 276 (1946).
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is inconsistent. In general, the rest of the legislative history clutters
up the question more than it detracts from the committees' state-
ments. A detracting factor was Senator McCarran's quotation of
the Attorney General, who said: "This reflects existing law.'"
The committee themselves were stumbling when they said: "The
phrase 'legal wrong' means such a wrong as is specified in subsec-
tion (e) of this section. It means that something more than mere
adverse personal effect must be an illegal effect. The law so made
relevant is not just constitutional law but any and all applicable
law." This statement confuses legal wrong with mere illegality and
confuses what must be shown to obtain review with what must be
shown to win on review. Similarly, Congressman Walter said on the
House floor: "Legal wrong means action or inaction in violation of
the law or the facts. The categories of questions of legal wrong are
set forth later as subsection (e) of section 10."0 The categories of
subsection (e) include action which is arbitrary, unconstitutional,
in excess of statutory jurisdiction, without observance of procedure
required by law, or unsupported by substantial evidence. The state-
ment of Congressman Walter seems to say that anyone would have
standing to prove illegality, whether or not he shows adverse effect
in fact. But since the constitutional concept of "case" or "con-
troversy" as interpreted by the Supreme Court requires adverse
effect, Congressman Walter's interpretation probably should be
modified to conform to constitutional requirements.
The solid part of the legislative history is thus the statement
of the Senate and House committees that one who is "adversely
affected in fact" may challenge administrative action.
The conclusion thus seems to be abundantly supported that one
who is in fact adversely affected may obtain judicial review, in
absence of adequate affirmative reasons for denying standing. The
rest of our inquiry into the law of standing to challenge will there-
fore be devoted to examination of possible affirmative reasons for
denying standing to one who is in fact adversely affected. 0
7. Id. at 310. The Attorney General cited six cases to implement this
statement.
8. Ibid.
9. Id. at 369. See also the statement of Senator Austin (id. at 308-09):
"For a long time we have known just what the meaning of 'legal injury' is.
It seems to me that by the use of the word 'wrong' a much broader category
of individuals is admitted to review." Thereupon the Senator quoted from
Bouvier's Law Dictionary, which in turn rested in part upon Blackstone, and
from Words and Phrases.
10. An example of denial of standing to one who is in fact adversely
affected is the denial of standing of a minority stockholder to object to action
which adversely affects his corporation. Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry. v. United
States, 281 U. S. 479 (1930). The standing of a holder of a majority of the
[Vol. 39:353
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§ 3. STATUTORY PROVISIONs AFFECTING STANDING
In addition to the APA, just discussed, other statutes may affect
the solution of problems of standing. Although a case or contro-
versy which is otherwise lacking cannot be created by statute, a
statute may create new interests or rights,1 thereby giving stand-
ing to one otherwise barred by lack of case or controversy. And a
statute conferring standing may affect the determination of whether
or not a right or a case or controversy exists.
The effect of such a statutory provision may be illustrated by
comparing Oklahoma v. Civil Service Commission 2 with Massa-
chusetts v. Mellon.13 In the Oklahoma case, the Civil Service Com-
mission entered an order finding a violation of the Hatch Act by a
member of the state highway commission; this finding foreshadowed
a further order reducing federal highway grants to Oklahoma, un-
less the State removed the offending commissioner from office.
Oklahoma instituted proceedings for review pursuant to a provision
allowing review by "any party aggrieved." Under Massachusetts v.
Mellon, the Court might have said that Oklahoma was not compelled
to take any federal funds, that acceptance of funds rested on consent,
and that Oklahoma had no standing to question the validity of fed-
eral grants. Instead, the Court held that the federal statute created
a "legal right" in Oklahoma, and that "By providing for judicial
review of the orders of the Civil Service Commission, Congress
made Oklahoma's right to receive funds a matter of judicial cog-
nizance. Oklahoma's right became legally enforceable."' 4 The Court
distinguished Massachusetts z. Mellon, the Lukens Steel case,15 and
stock is likewise denied. Schenley Distillers Corp. v. United States, 326
U. S. 432 (1946). The justification is that the management of the corpora-
tion has been entrusted with the protection of the corporation's interest. When
the stockholder has some interest of his own in which the corporation does
not entirely share, the stockholder has standing to protect that interest.
In American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 325 U. S. 385 (1945), a divided
Court upheld the standing of a stockholder to challenge SEC action requiring
the corporation to make a transfer from surplus to capital. Because of reduc-
tion in the amount available for dividends, the Court considered that the
stockholder had "a substantial financial or economic interest distinct from
that of the corporation which is directly and adversely affected." 325 U. S.
at page 388. Three dissenting justices took a view to which few businessmen
would subscribe-that "the stockholders' interest . . .is indistinct from that
of the corporation prior to an actual declaration." 325 U. S. at page 395.
11. A spectacular example of statutory creation of a new right in one
who would otherwise be an officious intermeddler is an informer statute. In
United States e-x rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U. S. 537 (1943), the Court applied
an informer statute of 1863 which permitted the informer to sue a person
who defrauds the government for double the amount of damage to the gov-
ernment, the informer retaining half the amount recovered as his own.
12. 330 U. S. 127 (1947).
13. 262 U. S. 447 (1923).
14. 330 U. S. at page 137.
15. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U. S. 113 (1940).
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the Alabama Power case' 6 by emphasizing "the authority for statu-
tory review and . . . the existence of the legally enforceable right
to receive allocated grants without unlawful deductions."' 7
The statutes governing leading federal agencies differ substan-
tially. The narrowest provision, one giving rise to virtually no
litigation, is that of the Federal Trade Commission Act: "Any per-
son... required by an order of the Commission to cease and desist
• .. may obtain a review.. .. ,,18 The Civil Aeronautics Act provides
that ". . . any order ... shall be subject to review ... upon peti-
tion . . . by any person disclosing a substantial interest in such
order,"'19 and that a suit may be brought by the Board or its agent
or "any party in interest" to enjoin violations of the Act or of the
regulations. -0 The Urgent Deficiencies Act,2" which governs most
proceedings for review of ICC orders, has no provision concerning
standing to obtain review, but the Interstate Commerce Act pro-
vides that "Any construction, operation, or abandonment contrary
to the provisions... may be enjoined ... at the suit of the United
States, the commission, any commission or regulating body of the
State or States affected, or any party in interest.122
Several important statutes provide for review at the instance
of one who is "aggrieved," but even the statutes employing this
concept differ in detail. The narrowest is the Federal Power Act:
"Any party to a proceeding ... aggrieved by an order issued by the
Commission in such proceeding may obtain a review .... ,"2-3 The
National Labor Relations Act provides: "Any person aggrieved by
a final order of the Board granting or denying in whole or in part
the relief sought may obtain review .... ,,24 The Securities Act pro-
16. Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U. S. 464 (1938).
17. 330 U. S. at page 139. Two justices did not participate and two
justices dissented without opinion. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, said
that the state could question only the correctness of the procedure and the
determinations of the Commission, not the validity of the Act.
For another good illustration of the effect of a statute providing for
review by a "person aggrieved," compare Atlanta v. Ickes, 308 U. S. 517
(1939) with Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F. 2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943),
dismissed as moot, 320 U. S. 707 (1943). These cases are discussed below at
pages 406-408.
18. 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 45(c).
19. 52 Stat. 1024 (1938), 49 U. S. C. A. § 646(a).
20. 52 Stat. 1025 (1938), 49 U. S. C. A. § 647(a).
21. 38 Stat. 208 (1913), 28 U. S. C. A. § 41(28).
22. 24 Stat. 379 (1887), 49 U. S. C. A. § 1(20). The Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act provides: "In a case of actual controversy as to the validity
of any order under subsection (e), any person who will be adversely affected
by such order if placed in effect may . . . file a petition ... " 52 Stat. 1055
(1938), 21 U. S. C. A. § 371(f) (1).
23. 49 Stat. 860 (1935), 16 U. S. C. A. § 8251(b).
24. 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 160(f).
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vides that "any person aggrieved by an order of the Commission
may obtain a review. .". "" The Public Utility Holding Company
Act and the Securities Exchange Act differ only slightly.26
A provision of the Communications Act is the most complex:
"An appeal may be taken... (1) By an applicant. . . whose appli-
cation is refused ... (2) By any other person aggrieved or whose
interests are adversely affected by any decision of the Commission
granting or refusing any such application.
' 27
The most common provision in state statutes seems to be that
"any party aggrieved" may obtain judicial review. The Model State
Administrative Procedure Act provides: "Any person aggrieved
by a final decision in a contested case ... is entitled to judicial re-
view thereof under this act..."2 8 Another section permits challenge
of a rule "when it appears that the rule, or its threatened applica-
tion, interferes with or impairs, the legal rights or privileges of the
petitioner."' 2 9
When the statutory provisions are brought into this juxtaposi-
tion, not much rhyme or reason behind the variations is discernible.
The cases indicate no appreciable difference between one who has
an "interest," one who is "adversely affected," and one who is
"aggrieved." True, each concept becomes a receptacle for ideas
about standing, but what is read into any one concept could just as
readily be read into either of the others. For instance, the cases
reveal no reason for believing that the Communications Act, con-
ferring standing upon "any . . . person aggrieved or whose inter-
ests are adversely affected," differs in substance from the Securities
Act, which is limited to "any person aggrieved."3 Similarly, the
provision of the Securities Act apparently has precisely the same
meaning as the words "any person or party aggrieved" in the Pub-
lic Utility Holding Company Act. The legislative language seems
25. 48 Stat. 80 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. § 77i(a).
26. Compare: "Any person or party aggrieved by an order . . . may
obtain review .. .", 49 Stat. 834 (1935), 15 U. S. C. A. § 79x(a) (Holding
Company Act) with "Any person aggrieved by an order ... in a proceeding
... to which such person is a party may obtain review . . .", 48 Stat. 901
(1934), 15 U. S. C. A. § 78y(a) (Securities Exchange Act).
27. 48 Stat. 926 (1934), 47 U. S. C. A. § 402(b).
28. Section 12(1) of the Model Act, Nat. Conf. of Comm'rs on Unif.
State Laws (1944).
29. Section 6(1).
30. This observation has as its authority the scores of cases cited in
this chapter. A specific judicial observation to the same effect is found in
Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F. 2d 694, 705 (2d Cir. 1943), dismissed
as moot, 320 U. S. 707 (1943). Yet the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act in a
single section permits "any interested person" to be heard at the administra-
tive proceeding, and allows "any person who will be adversely affected" to getjudicial review. 52 Stat. 1055 (1938), 21 U. S. C. A. § 371f.
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to have been largely fortuitous. Yet the restrictions in the Federal
Power Act and in the Securities Exchange Act seem to have been
deliberately designed to limit review to parties to the administra-
tive proceeding, and that fact is of significance in interpreting pro-
visions imposing no such explicit limitations.
§ 4. Is A "LEGAL RIG ET" NECESSARY TO A "CASE"
OR "CONTROVERSY"?
The worst trouble spot in the law of standing is the confusion
about the question whether an adverse effect in fact is enough to
confer standing, or whether a deprivation of a legal right is required.
A portion of the same question is the question whether the plaintiff
must assert deprivation of a legal right in order to satisfy the con-
stitutional requirement of case or controversy.
A part of the confusion stems from lack of definition or clarifica-
tion of terms. We shall use the term "interest" to signify a want or
desire; thus, everyone has an interest in food, clothing and shelter,
and a businessman has an interest in maximizing his profits, in-
cluding an interest in freedom from the kind of competition that
may reduce his profits. We shall use the term "right" or "legal
right" to mean a legally-protected interest; thus, the businessman
has no right or legal right to freedom from lawful competition even
though the effect is a reduction of his profits.
A plaintiff who seeks to challenge governmental action always
has standing if a legal right of the plaintiff is at stake. When a legal
right of the plaintiff is not at stake, a plaintiff sometimes has stand-
ing and sometimes lacks standing. Circular reasoning is very com-
mon, for one of the questions asked in order to determine whether a
plaintiff has standing is whether the plaintiff has a legal right, but
the question whether the plaintiff has a legal right is the final con-
clusion, for if the plaintiff has standing his interest is a legally-
protected interest, and that is what is meant by a legal right.
One type of judicial exposition appears in Tennessee Electric
Power Co. v. TVA. 31 Eighteen competing corporations sued to
enjoin operations of the TVA, asserting unconstitutionality. The
Supreme Court held the plaintiffs to be without standing to raise
the constitutional issues, because "the damage consequent on com-
petition, otherwise lawful, is in such circumstances damnum absque
injuria, and will not support a cause of action or a right to sue."'32
The catch lies in the two words "otherwise lawful." The plaintiffs
31. 306 U. S. 118 (1937).
32. 306 U. S. at page 140.
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were asserting that the competition was unlawful, and the Court
was denying them an opportunity to show the unlawfulness. The
question was not whether the plaintiffs had standing to challenge
lawful competition but whether they had standing to challenge com-
petition the lawfulness of which was at issue. The Court laid down
the palpably false proposition that one threatened with direct injury
by governmental action may not challenge that action "unless the
right invaded is a legal right,-one of property, one arising out of
contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on
a statute which confers a privilege. '33 If this proposition were the
law, then no one could challenge a statute outlawing the Baptist
Church, or prohibiting Republican speeches, or denying criminal
defendants a jury trial, or authorizing unlawful searches, or com-
pelling witnesses to testify against themselves.
The Court should have said that the plaintiffs were asserting "a
legal right,-one arising out of the Constitution." The plaintiffs'
theory was that under the Tenth Amendment Congress was ex-
ceeding its powers in establishing the TVA and in authorizing the
TVA to compete with the private companies. Since the plaintiffs
were in fact adversely affected by the TVA competition, the legal
right involved is a constitutional right, and the source of the con-
stitutional right is the Tenth Amendment.
No legal right in addition to a constitutional right is normally
required for a challenge of the constitutionality of governmental
action. For instance, if a statute infringes X's freedom of speech, X
may challenge, even though X has no legal right based upon "prop-
erty.., contract ... [freedom from] tortious invasion ... or...
a statute which confers a privilege." X's legal right stems from the
Constitution itself, just as the legal right of the eighteen power
companies stemmed from the Constitution itself. If Congress by
direct command or through delegation to an administrative agency
(instead of indirectly through government competition) regulates
the business of Y, then Y may challenge the constitutionality of
the regulation under the Tenth Amendment, even though no legal
right of Y is involved except the constitutional right conferred by
the Tenth Amendment.3"
33. 306 U. S. at pages 137-138.
34. In Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U. S. 464, 479-480 (1938),
the Court, in holding that a public utility adversely affected by competition of
municipal corporations to , h'-h the federal government made loans and
grants lacked standing to challenge the loans and grants, declared: "Where,
although there is damage, there is no violation of a right no action can be"
maintained .... The claim that petitioner will be injured, perhaps ruined,by the competition of the municipalities brought about by the use of the
1955]
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In Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.35 the Court also talked the lan-
guage of lack of legal right. The Public Contracts Act requires
those who sell goods to the government to comply with certain re-
quirements concerning labor. The companies contended that a wage
determination made in an administrative proceeding in which the
companies had participated involved erroneous statutory inter-
pretation. The asserted consequence was that the companies, in
order to supply goods to the government, had to comply with wage
schedules founded upon an error of law. The Supreme Court said:
"We are of opinion that no legal rights of respondents were shown
to have been invaded or threatened in the complaint upon which
the injunction... was based.... Respondents, to have standing in
court, must show an injury or threat to a particular right of their
own, as distinguished from the public's interest in the administra-
tion of law."36 The Court also asserted that "the Government enjoys
the unrestricted power ...to fix the terms and conditions upon
which it will make needed purchases," 37 that the statute was not
enacted for the protection of sellers, and that the statute "does not
represent an exercise by Congress of regulatory power over private
business or employment."38s
The Supreme Court later acknowledged that the govern-
ment does not enjoy "unrestricted power" in its contractual rela-
tions ;39 the government is still the government even when it acts in
its proprietary capacity, and discrimination against a racial or
religious group is therefore unconstitutional. Unconstitutionality of
such a discrimination could be asserted by one who has been in fact
hurt by such discrimination; no legal right in addition to the con-
stitutional right to be free from such discrimination is necessary.
If violation of the Constitution may be asserted by one who is in-
jured by the violation, the question arises why violation of a statute
moneys, therefore, presents a clear case of damnum absque injuria. .. . If
its business be curtailed or destroyed by the operations of the municipalities,
it will be by lawful competition from which no legal wrong results."
But in Frost v. Corporation Comm., 278 U. S. 515 (1929), the Court
held that one having a franchise may secure an injunction against the illegal
grant of a franchise to another.
See also the many cases discussed in the section on Competition, infra.
35. 310U. S. 113 (1940).
36. 310 U. S. at page 125.
37. 310 U. S. at page 127.
38. 310 U. S. at page 128.
39. See United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75, 100 (1947):
"Appellants urge that federal emoloyees are protected by the Bill of Rights
and that Congress may not 'enact a regulation providing that no Republican,
Jew or Negro shall be appointed to federal office, or that no federal employee
shall attend Mass or take any active part in missionary work.' None would
deny such limitations on congressional power ...
[Vol. 39:353
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may not be asserted by one who is injured by the violation. The best
reason, in the context of the Lukens case, probably is that the statu-
tory provisions violated were not enacted for the protection of those
who were asserting the violation. That is why the companies in the
Lukens case lacked a "legal right" on which standing could be based.
What the Court did not inquire into in the Luckens opinion is why
the companies which are adversely affected by the asserted misinter-
pretation of the statute should not be enlisted as natural law en-
forcers, whether or not a legal right of the companies is violated.
The opinion was written in terms of what "the Government" may
do in making contracts; a more refined view would be that govern-
ment officers were making contracts on behalf of the government,
that Congress is also a participant in the exercise of the govern-
ment's proprietary functions, and that the most practicable way to
keep the government's contracting officers within their statutory
powers is by letting complainants like those in the Lukens case ob-
tain judicial review of the officers' action.
Although the Lukens case was unanimous, it has been legislative-
ly reversed,40 and it is difficult or impossible to reconcile with other
Supreme Court decisions.
Perhaps the most prominent Supreme Court case recognizing
standing in absence of violation of a "legal right" of the plaintiff is
FCC v. Sanders Brothers.41 The question was the standing of an
existing broadcasting station, which would be economically injured
by competition, to challenge the Commission's grant of a construc-
tion permit for a new station. The Court first held that "resulting
economic injury to a rival station is not, in and of itself, and apart
from considerations of public convenience, interest, or necessity, an
element the [Commission] must weigh and as to which it must
make findings in passing on an application for a broadcasting
license." 42 The Court emphasized that "the Act recognizes that the
field of broadcasting is one of free competition," and that "Congress
has not, in its regulatory scheme, abandoned the principle of free
competition, as it has done in the case of railroads.. .,,4 The Court
also declared that "The policy of the Act is clear that no person is
to have anything in the nature of a property right as a result of the
40. 66 Stat. 308 (1952), 41 U. S. C. A. § 43a (1953 Supp.). The sponsor
of the amendment referred to the Lukens case and said: "It is our purpose,
by this amendment, to overturn that decision." Senator Fulbright, 98 Cong.
Rec. 6641 (1952).
41. -309U. S. 470 (1940).
42. 309 U. S. at page 473.
43. 309 U. S. at page 474.
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granting of a license," 4 and that "Plainly it is not the purpose of the
Act to protect a licensee against competition but to protect the
public."4 5 At that point the Court might have been expected to refer
to the Tennessee Electric case" which had been decided only three
years earlier, and to say that standing cannot be based upon an
interest in freedom from competition but that a "legal right" is
necessary. Instead, however, 1.he Court said exactly the opposite:
"Congress... may have been of opinion that one likely to be finan-
cially injured by the issue of a license would be the only person hav-
ing a sufficient interest to bring to the attention of the appellate
court errors of law in the action of the Commission in granting the
license. It is within the power of Congress to confer such standing
to prosecute an appeal. We hold, therefore, that the respondent had
the requisite standing to appeal and to raise, in the court below, any
relevant question of law in respect of the order of the Commis-
sion."'
7
The only difference between the Tennessee Electric case and the
Sanders case that affects the problem of standing is that in the
Tennessee Electric case no statutory provision affected the prob-
lem of standing but that in the Sanders case the statute provided for
judicial review by an applicant or by "any other person aggrieved
or whose interests are adversely affected . . ." If the key to the two
holdings on standing lies in this statutory provision, then whenever
the APA is applicable, a "legal right" is unnecessary to confer
standing, since the APA provides for review at the instance of "any
person... adversely affected or aggrieved... within the meaning
of any relevant statute...,,48
The Sanders doctrine as further developed in the Scripps-
Howard and KOA cases49 is of primary importance to the law of
standing, for the Supreme Court in the three cases has enunciated
the principle that one whose only interest in attacking the adminis-
trative action is to avoid a new or increased competition has stand-
ing to make the attack, even though it is specifically recognized that
the attacker has no "legal right" at stake.
The Sanders doctrine already has had considerable impact upon
the law of standing, and it is likely to continue to be of central im-
44. 309 U. S. at page 475.
45. Ibid.
46. Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U. S. 118 (1937), dis-
cussed above at pages 360-361.
47. 309 U. S. at page 477.
48. Section 10 (a).
49. Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U. S. 4 (1942); FCC v. NBC(KOA), 319 U. S. 239 (1943).
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portance. The practical effect of the doctrine is essentially sound;
one who is in fact adversely affected should have standing to chal-
lenge the legality of administrative action, for reasons stated above
in section 2.
The doctrine nevertheless is deserving of adverse criticism from
the standpoint of its unnecessary undermining of the accustomed
meaning of words. The notion that the complaining station has no
"legal right" but that its financial or economic "interest" in avoid-
ing new competition is entitled to legal protection is the sheerest
logomachy, for the only practical issue is whether or not the right or
interest should be entitled to legal protection. To provide legal pro-
tection to what the Court solemnly asserts is not a "right" is merely
twisting the usual meaning of words, impairing an established means
of communication, and causing needless confusion and complexity.
If the Court gives legal protection to the interest, then denying
that the holder of the interest has a "right" is contradictory, if the
usual meaning of these terms is followed. The most amusing con-
sequence of this web of unreality lies in the proposition for which
the Sanders case now stands-that the complaining station has a
remedy without a right!
The cure for this excessive conceptual refinement lies in the
plain and practical simplicity of acknowledging that if the "interest"
is legally protected, then it deserves to be called a "right." Despite
the statutory provision that "no such license shall be construed to
create any right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the
license," the Court could easily say that the licensee still may be
"aggrieved" or "adversely affected" within the meaning of the re-
view provision and therefore may represent its own interest in
securing judicial review, just as a carrier with an economic interest
may get judicial review of ICC action and may assert its own inter-
est. To say that a station "aggrieved" or "adversely affected" has a
"right" to prevent illegal action would be consistent with the pro-
vision limiting rights created by licenses. This simple solution would
satisfy the case or controversy doctrine requirement; it would escape
needless confusion about the distinction between rights and inter-
ests; it would end the artificiality of pretending that a private party
upholding one side of an adversary proceeding may not represent
his own interest.
The substance of the Sanders doctrine, as distinguished from the
artificial language technique, is likely to endure, and is likely gradu-
ally to prevail in fields other than regulation of broadcasting. We
shall explore the doctrine further in the ensuing two sections.
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§ 5. STANDING TO ASSERT PUBLIC RIGHTS; THE DOCTRINE OF
"PRIVATE ATTORNEY GENERALS"
A vital feature of the Sanders case,50 just discussed, is that "one
likely to be financially injured," even though lacking legal right,
may challenge not only those eatures of the administrative action
which may cause injury to the complainant but may, in the words
of the Court, "raise ... any relevant question of law in respect of
the order of the Commission.' The Sanders opinion, as further
developed in subsequent cases, means that the person with standing
(1) represents the public interest and (2) does not represent his
own private interest, and that (3) the interests asserted on the
appeal may be different from those which confer standing to appeal.
In Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC5 2 the Court explained the
Sanders doctrine: "The Communications Act of 1934 did not create
new private rights. The purpose of the Act was to protect the public
interest in communications. By § 402(b) (2) Congress gave the
right of appeal to persons 'aggrieved or whose interests are ad-
versely affected' by Commission action .... But these private liti-
gants have standing only as representatives of the public interest.
. .. That a court is called upon to enforce public rights and not
the interests of private property does not diminish its power to pro-
tect such rights .... [T]he rights to be vindicated are those of the
public and not of the private litigants."5 3
The meaning of the Court seems to be unmistakable that the
complainant has standing to assert rights other than his own.
In FCC v. NBC (KOA)5 4 the Court held four to two that KOA,
whose broadcast would be interfered with by grant to WAFHDH of
approval for an increase in power and for operation unlimited in
time, could intervene in the proceeding on the WHDH application
and had standing to get review. The majority pointed out merely
that Sanders had held that despite lack of property right, "economic
injury gave the existing station standing to present questions of
public interest and convenience by appeal from the order of the
Commission." 55 Mr. Justice Frankfurter said in dissent: "Since the
Commission in exercising its licensing function must be governed
by the public interest and not the private interest of existing
licensees, an appellant . . . appears only to vindicate the public
50. FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U. S. 470 (1940).
51. 309 U. S. at page 477.
52. 316 U. S. 4 (1942).
53. 316 U. S. at pages 14-15.
54. 319 U. S. 239 (1943).
55. 319 U. S. at page 247.
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interest and not his own. . . . That the Commission's order may
impair the value of an existing station's license is in itself no ground
for invalidating the order; it merely may create standing to attack
the validity of the order on other grounds. Whatever doubts may
have existed as to whether the ingredients of 'case' or 'controversy,'
as defined, for example, in Muskrat v. United States ... are present
in this situation were dispelled by our ruling in the Sanders case
that the legality of a Commission order can be challenged by one
'aggrieved' or 'whose interests are adversely affected' thereby, even
though the source of his grievance is not what is claimed to make the
order unlawful. But from this it must not be concluded that any-
one who claims to be 'aggrieved' or who is in any way adversely
affected by Commission action has a right to appeal.... In order to
establish its right to appeal ... KOA had to make a showing that
its interests were substantially impaired by a grant of the WI-DH
application." 6
No good reason is apparent why the Sanders doctrine, as further
developed by the later cases, should not be of general applicability
whenever either the APA or another statute containing an "ad-
versely affected" provision is applicable. Perhaps the most compre-
hensive and penetrating opinion written by any court on the prob-
lem of standing is that of Judge Frank in the Associated Industries
case. 7 An association of consumers of coal sought to challenge
orders directing an increase in minimum prices of coal. The statute
provided that "any person aggrieved by an order issued by the
Commission in a proceeding to which such person is a party" could
56. 319 U. S. at pages 259-260.
Mr. Justice Douglas dissented in both the Scripps-Howard case and the
KOA case. In the former he apparently took the rather extreme position that
a station's interest in avoiding a substantial reduction in number of listeners
is insufficient to establish a case or controversy. But in the second case he
only reiterated "doubts" and "concern" about whether the Sanders and
Scripps-Howard doctrine satisfied the Muskrat requirements of case or
controversy, and emphasized that if something short of a substantive right
suffices for standing, "then I think we must be exceedingly scrupulous to see
to it that his interest in the matter is substantial and immediate. Otherwise
we will not only permit the administrative process to be clogged by judicial
review; we will run afoul of the constitutional requirement of case or con-
troversy." 319 U. S. at page 265. The Sanders and Scripps-Howard cases,
said Mr. Justice Douglas, do not dispense with the requirement that KOA
must show that it has sustained or is about to sustain some direct and sub-
stantial injury. "They merely hold that an appellant has his case decided in
light of the standards of the public interest, not by the criteria which give
him a standing to appeal." 319 U. S. at page 266.
57. Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F. 2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943), dis-
missed as moot 320 U. S. 707 (1943). This decision may well be an instance
of the rare phenomenon of a lower court's decision superseding a recent
Supreme Court decision. This may be true even in spite of the language of
Judge Frank distinguishing Atlanta v. Ickes, 308 U. S. 517 (1939).
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seek review, and the association was a party to the administrative
proceeding. In Atlanta v. Ickes,5" the Supreme Court had pre-
viously held that a consumer had no standing to challenge an order
fixing a minimum price for coal, but that was an equity proceeding
not brought under the "person aggrieved" provision. The court in
the Associated Industries case made an elaborate analysis of the
Sanders, Scripps-Howard, and KOA cases and held that the asso-
ciation had standing to challenge the order.
The essence of Judge Frank's analysis is especially important
because it seems both unanswerable and of broad applicability:
"While Congress can constitutionally authorize no one, in the ab-
sence of an actual justiciable controversy, to bring a suit for the
judicial determination either of the constitutionality of a statute or
the scope of powers conferred by a statute upon government officers,
it can constitutionally authorize one of its own officials, such as the
Attorney General, to bring a proceeding to prevent another official
from acting in violation of his statutory powers; for then an actual
controversy exists, and the Attorney General can properly be vested
with authority, in such a controversy, to vindicate the interest of the
public or the government. Instead of designating the Attorney Gen-
eral, or some other public officer, to bring such proceedings, Con-
gress can constitutionally enact a statute conferring on any non-
official person, or on a designated group of non-official persons,
authority to bring a suit to prevent action by an officer in violation
of his statutory powers; for then, in like manner, there is an actual
controversy, and there is nothing constitutionally prohibiting Con-
gress from empowering any person, official or not, to institute a
proceeding involving such a controversy, even if the sole purpose
is to vindicate the public interest. Such persons, so authorized, are,
so to speak, private Attorney Generals."59
The basic idea of the private Attorney General who can sue to
vindicate the public interest is a very old one. One manifestation
of it is in the informer statutes. A sample is a 1905 opinion of the
Supreme Court which carried out an Ohio informer statute which
had been in effect since 1831. The Court explained: "Statutes pro-
viding for actions by a common informer, who himself had no
interest whatever in the controversy other than that given by
statute, have been in existence for hundreds of years in England,
and in this country ever since the foundation of our Government.
The right to recover the penalty or forfeiture granted by statute is
58. 308 U. S. 517 (1939).
59. 134 F. 2d at page 704.
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frequently given to the first common informer who brings the action,
although he has no interest in the matter except as such informer." 60
More recently the Supreme Court carded out an informer stat-
ute according to its terms in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess.61
The statute provided that "any" person may sue certain defrauders
of the government for double damages and keep half. The Court held
the statute constitutional and held: "'Suits may be brought and
carried on by any person,' says the Act, and there are no words of
exception or qualification such as we are asked to find." 62
§ 6. STANDING TO INITIATE A REVIEW PROCEEDING ON THE BASIS
OF ASSERTION OF THE RIGHTS OF ANOTHER
In what circumstances, if at all, does one private party have
standing to assert the rights of another private party?
In order to answer this question, we shall have to make the im-
portant distinction between standing to initiate a review proceed-
ing and standing to assert illegality in a proceeding already properly
commenced. This section deals with the first kind of standing, and
the succeeding section with the second.
From the doctrine that one who is adversely affected may en-
force the rights of the public, it is only a short step to the proposi-
tion that one who is adversely affected may enforce the rights of
another person. In the broadcasting field, for instance, the public
rights seem to include all or most of the private rights, and in the
Sanders opinion the Court said that the complaining broadcasting
station could "raise ... any relevant question of law in respect of
the order of the Commission. '"63
Our problem is not that of authorized representation; the law
is quite clear that Associated Industries may assert the rights of
its members, consumers of coal,6 4 and that the National Coal Asso-
ciation may represent producers of coal, and such organizations as
the United Mine Workers and the Railway Labor Executives As-
sociation may assert the rights of their members.65
60. Marvin v. Trout, 199 U. S. 212 (1905).
61. 317 U. S. 537 (1943).
62. 317 U. S. at page 546.
63. FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U. S. 470, 477 (1940).
64. Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F. 2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943), dis-
missed as moot 320 U. S. 707 (1943).
65. National Coal Ass'n v. FPC, 191 F. 2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1951), in which
the coal association, United Mine Workers, and Railway Labor Executives
Association were allowed to challenge the grant of a certificate of convenience
and necessity to construct natural gas pipelines.
In Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123(1951) Mr. Justice Jackson was the only justice to discuss the standing of the




The cases go both ways on the question whether one person who
is not the authorized representative of another may assert the rights
of the other. An outstanding example of a denial of standing is
Tileston v. Ullnan,6 6 holding -that a physician could not challenge
the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting the use of drugs or
instruments to prevent conception. The physician asserted that the
statute would prevent his giving professional advice concerning the
use of contraceptives to three patients whose condition of health
was such that their lives would be endangered by child-bearing.
The Court said that the physician was asserting his patients' rights
and not his own: "His patients are not parties to this proceeding
and there is no basis on which we can say that he has standing to
secure an adjudication of his patients' constitutional right to life,
which they do not assert in their own behalf." That the holding was
well supported by previous authority is shown by the Court's cita-
tion of cases holding that one who is not a female or delegated to
champion any grievance of females may not assert the constitutional
rights of females with respect to a statute prohibiting serving them
liquor behind a screen,6 7 that one doing a large business may not
assert unconstitutionality with respect to those doing a small busi-
ness, 68 that witnesses subpenaed in a grand jury investigation in-
quiring into corrupt practices in primary elections had no standing
to challenge constitutionality of congressional power to regulate
primaries,69 that one having no maritime lien may not challenge
the validity of a statute which might adversely affect such a lien,70
and that subcontractors may not assert rights of their contractors.7 1
The Supreme Court, however, is quite willing to permit one
person to assert the rights of another, even when constitutional
rights are involved. An important early case is Pierce v. Society
of Sisters.7 2 A private school was allowed to challenge a statute re-
quiring parents to send children of specified ages to public schools.
The private school was adversely affected to the extent of being
put out of business, but the constitutional rights asserted were those
of parents and children. The Court held that the statute "unreason-
ably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct
the upbringing and education of children under their control."
66. 318 U. S. 44 (1943).
67. Cronin v. Adams, 192 U. S. 108, 114 (1904).
68. Standard Stock Food Co. v. Wright, 225 U. S. 540 (1912).
69. Blair v. United States, 250 U. S. 273 (1919).
70. The Winnebago, 205 U. S. 354, 360 (1907).
71. Davis & Farnum Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 U. S. 207, 220
(1903).
72. 268 U. S. 510 (1925).
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Dealing specifically with the problem of standing, the Court said
only that the business and property "are threatened with destruc-
tion through the unwarranted compulsion . . . over present and
prospective patrons of their schools. And this court has gone very
far to protect against loss threatened by such action. ' ' 73 The Court
clearly recognized the standing of the school to assert the consti-
tutional rights of parents and children.
74
Cases in support of the Pierce case may be more numerous than
is commonly supposed. Any lawyer can probably call to mind cases
otherwise familiar, in which one party asserted constitutional rights
of another. In Wuchter v. PiZZutti,75 the Court held that a statute
providing for service of process upon the Secretary of State in an
action against a non-resident motorist is unconstitutional because
the statute did not provide for adequate notice to the defendant.
Yet the defendant in the case had been personally served. In effect,
what the defendant did was to assert successfully the constitutional
rights of unknown non-resident motorists who might not be given
adequate notice under the statute.
In Helvering v. Gerhardt,70 the Court said in the first sentence
of its opinion: "The question for decision is whether the imposi-
tion of a federal income tax for the calendar years 1932 and 1933
on salaries received by respondents, as employees of the Port of
New York Authority, places an unconstitutional burden on the
States of New York and New Jersey." The taxpayer was allowed to
assert the constitutional rights of the states.
The Supreme Court has often cited the Pierce case with ap-
proval,'7 7 and never with disapproval. The doctrine of the case is
therefore very much alive, although the holding is not easily recon-
ciled with the line of cases represented by Tileston v. Ullnzan."5 On
the merits, the reasons in favor of the Pierce holding are strong; the
school was adversely affected by the statute to the extent of being
73. 268 U. S. at 535.
74. The cases the Court relied upon do not seem to support the result.
The one that comes the closest may be Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S.
197 (1923). The opinion of the Supreme Court in that case is consistent with
the view that citizens were allowed to assert the constitutional rights of
aliens. But the report of the case in the lower court reveals that the plaintiffs
were not only citizens but also an alien whose constitutional rights were
asserted. Terrace v. Thompson, 274 Fed. 841 (W.D. Wash. 1921).
75. 276 U. S. 13 (1928).
76. 304U. S. 405 (1938).
77. The Court not only discussed the Pierce case with approval in
Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249 (1953), but it relied heavily upon the
case. Other recent references with approval include Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U. S. 123, 141 (1951) ; CBS v. United
States, 316 U. S. 407, 423 (1942).
78. 318 U. S. 44 (1943).
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put out of business, and the problem of constitutionality of the
statute was a serious one.
Because of the theoretical :-eluctance of courts to decide consti-
tutional issues, standing to raise a nonconstitutional issue might
well be allowed when standing to raise a constitutional issue is
denied.
Safeway Stores v. Di Salle is a representative case involving
the basic problem of whether or not a court should set aside ad-
ministrative action upon the petition of a party who asserts viola-
tion of a statutory provision designed to protect a class which
does not include the petitioner. A retail food chain sought review
of a regulation fixing price ceilings on the ground that the regula-
tion would violate a statutory provision designed to protect pro-
ducers of agricultural commodities. The court held rather sum-
marily that the retailer had no standing.
Probably a good many courts would dispose of the Safeway
case in the same way. But a powerful brief could be written in favor
of standing of the retailer-a brief that not many courts would re-
sist. The brief would show that the Administrator in fixing the
price ceiling has violated a specific statutory limitation on the power
of the Administrator, that the regulation is contrary to the policy
declared by Congress in the Act, and that the result is to inflict
direct and illegal injury upon the petitioner. The specific statutory
provision violated is in the nature of a restriction upon the Ad-
ministrator's power: "No ceiling shall be established or maintained
for any agricultural commodity below the highest of the following
prices . . .,,' This is followed by an elaborate statement of the
statutory limits upon the Administrator's power. The purpose of
the statutory provision is not merely to benefit the producers of
agricultural commodities but to protect the entire economy of the
nation, of which retailers are a part. The overall purpose is ex-
plicitly stated by Congress in the first section of the enactment: "It
is the intent of Congress to provide authority necessary to achieve
the following purposes in order to promote the national defense:
To prevent inflation and preserve the value of the national cur-
rency; . . . to stabilize the cost of living for workers and other con-
sumers and the costs of production for farmers and business-
men . . ."I Congress goes on in the first section: "It is the intent
of Congress that the authority conferred ... shall be exercised ...
with full consideration and emphasis, so far as practicable, on ...
79. 198 F. 2d 269 (Eni. Ct 1952).
80. 64 Stat 803 (1950), 50 U. S. C. A. Appendix § 2102(d) (3) (1951).
81. 64 Stat. 803 (1950), 50 U. S. C. A. Appendix § 2101 (1951).
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the maintenance and furtherance of a sound agricultural indus-
try . . .118
What the Administrator has done is not merely to exceed his
powers in a manner specifically prohibited by the provision de-
signed to protect producers of agricultural commodities. The pro-
tection of such producers is a part of the primary overall intent of
Congress in enacting the legislation and in conferring powers upon
the Administrator.
The problem of standing is whether the retailer, which is direct-
ly injured by the Administrator's action in excess of his statutory
authority, may assert the violation of one of the explicitly declared
purposes of the entire regulatory program. No one is in a better
position to assert such a violation than a party which is directly in-
jured by the illegal regulation fixing an illegal ceiling on the par-
ticular party's prices. Such a party will know of the violation and
will be in a position to object to it; the effect upon producers of
agricultural commodities is relatively remote.
Furthermore, the statute specifically provides that "any person
who is aggrieved by the denial or partial denial of his protest" is
entitled to judicial review.8 3 The Supreme Court interpreted such
a provision in the Sanders case as meaning that one who is adverse-
ly affected by mere economic competition could "raise . . . any
relevant question of law in respect of the order of the Commis-
sion."8 4 One whose prices are directly subject to the illegal regula-
tion is much more deserving of standing to challenge the regulation
than one who is merely injured by competition, for the policy of
the law is to encourage competition, but the policy of the law here is,
as declared by Congress, "furtherance of a sound agricultural in-
dustry." The retailer here is therefore a person aggrieved, and the
Administrator has denied its protest. The conclusion is accordingly
compelled that the retailer has standing under the statute.
Resort to the doctrine of "private Attorney Generals" is unneces-
sary in order to show the standing of the retailer. But that doctrine
is an independent reason for upholding the retailer's standing and
makes the retailer's standing doubly clear. As the Supreme Court
said in the Scripps-Howard case, private litigants objecting to il-
legal administrative action may have standing "as representatives
of the public interest."' 8 5 Congress might have authorized the At-
torney General to bring actions to assure that the public interest is
82. Ibld.
83. 64 Stat. 808 (1950), 50 U. S. C. A. Appendix § 2108 (1951).84. FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U. S. 470, 477 (1940).
85. Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U. S. 4, 14 (1942).
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not jeopardized by administrative action which, as here, is directly
opposed to the explicitly declared intent of Congress. As Judge
Frank said in his outstanding opinion in the Associated Industries
case, "Congress can constitutionally enact a statute conferring on
any non-official person... authority to bring a suit to prevent ac-
tion by an officer in violation of his statutory powers ... Such per-
sons, so authorized, are, so to speak, private Attorney Generals." '' *
A third reason, wholly independent of the other two, could be
asserted except for the statutcry exclusion from the Administrative
Procedure Act.8 7 That Act provides that "any person adversely
affected" shall be entitled to judicial review,88 and the reports of
the committees of both House and Senate said that this means
"any person adversely affected in fact." That the retailer is adverse-
ly affected by the unduly low price ceiling is too clear for argument.
Such is the brief for the standing of the retailer in the Safeway
case. Perhaps the position taken in the brief is sounder and in the
long run will produce more satisfactory results than the position
taken by the court in the Safeway case.
Some important cases which allow one person to assert the
rights of another rest upon a special explanation which does not
affect the cases discussed in this section. We now turn to those cases.
§ 7. STANDING To ASSERT THE RIGHTS OF ANOTHER IN A PRO-
CEEDING ALREADY PROPERLY COMMENCED; STANDING TO INDUCE
A COURT TO AcT ON ITS OWN MOTION
In the preceding section, we dealt with the problem of stand-
ing of one to assert the legal rights of another, but our discussion
was limited to cases involving standing to initiate a review pro-
ceeding. Now we consider the problem of standing of one to assert
the legal rights of another in a proceeding which has already been
properly initiated. The difference between the two kinds of stand-
ing is an important one.
In the 1953 case of Bar'ows v. Jackson,"' whites were per-
mitted to assert the constitutional rights of non-Caucasians; not
only that, but the non-Caucasians whose constitutional rights were
asserted were non-Caucasians in general and not any particular or
identified ones. The plaintiffs, whites, sued the defendant, a white,
in a state court for damages for breach of a restrictive covenant
86. Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F. 2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943).
87. 64 Stat. 819 (1950), 50 U. S. C. A. Appendix § 2159 (1951).
88. The "except" clauses in the introductory clause of section 10 do not
affect the present problem.
89. 346 U. S. 249 (1953).
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against use or occupation of land by non-Caucasians. The Supreme
Court held that an award of damages by the state court would vio-
late the Fourteenth Amendment because: "To compel respondent
to respond in damages would be for the State to punish her for her
failure to perform her covenant to continue to discriminate against
non-Caucasions in the use of her property."90
The Court in the Barrows case dealt explicitly with the standing
problem. After mentioning the requirement of a "case" or "con-
troversy," the Court said: "Apart from the jurisdictional require-
ment, this Court has developed a complementary rule of self-
restraint for its own governance (not always clearly distinguished
from the constitutional limitation) which ordinarily precludes a
person from challenging the constitutionality of state action by
invoking the rights of others." 91 The Court then acknowledged a
line of cases "that even though a party will suffer a direct substan-
tial injury from application of a statute, he cannot challenge its
constitutionality unless he is within the class whose constitutional
rights are allegedly infringed. . . . This is a salutary rule, the
validity of which we reaffirm. ' 92
The Court's principal explanation for departing from the salu-
tary rule was this: "But in the instant case, we are faced with a
unique situation in which it is the action of the state court which
might result in a denial of constitutional rights and in which it
would be difficult if not impossible for the persons whose rights are
asserted to present their grievance before any court. Under the
peculiar circumstances of this case, we believe the reasons which
underlie our rule denying standing to raise another's rights, which
is only a rule of practice, are outweighed by the need to protect the
fundamental rights which would be denied by permitting the dam-
ages action to be maintained."93
This explanation is not an adequate one. Calling the situation
"unique" solves nothing and provides no guide for the future. That
the persons whose rights are asserted cannot present their griev-
ance before any court is hardl r a reason for disregarding the usual
requirement that the party who does challenge must have proper
standing. The Court gives no reason for its implicit conclusion that
the rules about standing should be different when the challenged
action is that of a court instead of that of a legislative or administra-
tive body.
90. 346 U. S. at page 254.
91. 346 U. S. at page 255.
92. 346 U. S. at page 256-257.
93. 346 U. S. at page 257.
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When the Supreme Court in the Barrows case refused to follow
its usual rule on the ground that the case was "unique," the Court
apparently had an instinct that the case was different from the cases
it distinguished, but it failed to articulate that difference. The Court's
instinct was probably entirely sound, and the difference that the
Court felt involves an important principle.
The crucial difference is the difference between initiating a pro-
ceeding-setting the judicial machinery in motion-and calling to
the court's attention something that the court may do on its own
motion. The principle is that a party always has standing to call to
a tribunal's attention (whether court or agency) the illegality of a
course of action which the tribunal is contemplating. The same
party in the same proceeding may lack standing to initiate a review
proceeding but may have standing to ask the reviewing court to
refrain from a course of action which the court may on its own
motion refrain from taking. When the judicial machinery is already
in motion and the question before the court is the direction of the
action to be taken, the court on its own motion, whether or not any
party urges it, may reject a course of action which would involve
unconstitutionality or violation of statutory or common law, for the
court has the affirmative obligation of avoiding any judicial action
that would be unconstitutional or otherwise illegal.
When the damages action in the Barrows case came before the
state court, the plaintiff and the defendant were both properly be-
fore the court, and the judicial machinery had been set in motion
by the filing of the damages action. The state court could have
ignored any problem of the standing of the defendant to assert the
constitutional rights of the unidentified Negroes, and it could have
held on its own motion that an award of damages by the state court
would violate the constitutional law laid down by the Supreme
Court in Shelley v. Kraemer.' Indeed, if the state court did not so
hold, its own action would involve unconstitutionality. The fact is
that both the trial court and the appellate court in the Barrows case
did refuse damages. That refusal, in any view of the standing prob-
lem, was sound, and any possible doubt about it has to do with
extension of the substantive principle of Shelley v. Kraemer.
The defendant having Won in the state courts, the plaintiff
sought review by the Supreme Court. Did the plaintiff have stand-
ing to get Supreme Court review? The answer is clearly yes, for
94. 334 U. S. 1 (1948), holding that a restrictive covenant could not
be enforced in equity against Negro purchasers, because such enforcement
would involve state action contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment.
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the plaintiff was seeking damages for breach of the restrictive
covenant and had the same standing as any other plaintiff in any
damages action; it was the defendant who was asserting the consti-
tutional rights of the unidentified Negroes. Then did the defendant
have standing before the Supreme Court to assert the constitutional
rights of unidentified parties not before the Court? The answer is
yes, because the problem of standing is nothing more than the prob-
lem of whether the defendant could call to the Supreme Court's
attention the unconstitutionality of a reversal of the judgment
entered by the state courts-something that the Supreme Court
not only could consider but should consider on its own motion.
Therefore the result was clearly right.
The holding in the Barrows case was thus neither an exception
to nor a violation of what the Court called the "salutary rule" that a
person may not challenge the constitutionality of governmental
action unless he is within the class whose constitutional rights are
allegedly infringed. But the "salutary" rule needs to be restated
to limit it to the question whether the person whose standing is in
question may initiate a proceeding to challenge the constitutionality
of governmental action. The rule does not extend to standing to
raise a question which the court may raise on its own motion. The
cases represented by the Pierce case9 are exceptions to the so-
called rule as thus modified, but the Barrows case is entirely con-
sistent with the rule.
The rule applies equally to challenges of constitutionality of
legislative action, judicial action, and administrative action. If we
substitute an administrative agency for the state courts in the
Barrows case, all the results will be the same.
But one further observation is important. The question whether
a party has standing to set the machinery of the reviewing court in
motion does not arise if the initial tribunal, whether court or
agency, decides against the course of action that is assertedly un-
constitutional, but that question does arise if the initial tribunal
decides in favor of the course of action that is assertedly unconsti-
tutional. In the Barrows case, since the trial court chose the consti-
tutional course of action, the only question for the state appellate
court was whether to reverse, and the appellate court could on its
own motion decide in favor of a refusal of reversal on the ground
that a reversal would be unconstitutional. The same is true of the
Supreme Court of the United States.
95. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925), discussed above
at pages 370-371.
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If in the Barrows case the state courts had decided for the plain-
tiff, then the defendant in seeking review by the Supreme Court
would have had the burden of setting the Supreme Court's review-
ing procedure in motion, and would have had to have standing to
do so, for the defendant then would have been asking something
that the Court could not do on its own motion. The defendant's
standing to raise the constitutional question would have rested
upon the assertion of the constitutional rights of unidentified
Negroes not before the Court. Accordingly, the question of standing
would have been whether to follow the so-called "salutary rule" or
whether to follow the cases represented by the Pierce case, which
are exceptions to the rule.
The major propositions of law that grow out of analysis of the
Barrows case may be summarized: (1) One who lacks standing to
set judicial machinery in motion may have standing, after the
machinery is already in motion, to point out that a contemplated
course of action will be unconstitutional or otherwise illegal, for
the court on its own motion may properly refrain from that course
of action, but the court on its own motion may not initiate a pro-
ceeding or start the judicial machinery in motion. (2) If the initial
tribunal, whether court or agency, acts unconstitutionally or other-
wise illegally, the party who seeks review must have standing to
set the judicial machinery of the reviewing court in motion-some-
thing that the reviewing court cannot itself do. (3) If the initial
tribunal, whether court or agency, refrains from a course of action
on the ground that that course of action would be unconstitutional,
the reviewing court may on its own motion refrain from a reversal
of the initial tribunal's decision, whether or not any party before
the reviewing court has standing to assert that the rejected course
of action would be unconstitutional.
The old case of Buchanan %i. Warley9  provides further illustra-
tion of the distinction between standing to initiate a proceeding and
standing to induce a court to act on its own motion. A white sued a
colored person for specific performance of a contract of sale to the
colored person of real property, and the defendant defended on the
ground that the contract by its terms was not binding unless the
defendant was legally entitled to occupy the property as a residence.
The constitutionality of a segregation ordinance was thus brought
into question. The white, not the colored person, was asserting un-
constitutionality of the ordinance. The Court explained its decision
allowing the challenge by saying that the plaintiff could challenge
96. 245 U. S. 60 (1917).
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because his right to sell his property was involved. The difficulty
with this explanation is that the constitutional rights are those of the
colored person, not those of the person who is selling to the colored
person.07 The reality of the case is that the white was allowed to
assert the constitutional rights of the Negro. But the problem of
standing was not whether the plaintiff could initiate his proceeding
on the basis of assertion of the rights of another; the plaintiff
clearly had standing to institute a suit for specific perf6rmance.
The only question of standing was whether, after proceeding had
been properly commenced, the plaintiff could assert that the ordi-
nance was unconstitutional. If no party had made any such asser-
tion, the Court might properly on its own motion have determined
what was the correct law for the disposition of the case, including
the constitutional law. Therefore, the only question of standing was
whether the plaintiff could call to the Court's attention the law that
the Court on its own motion was free to use.9 8
Challenge of administrative action on nonconstitutional grounds
is governed by the same principles as challenge of any governmental
action on constitutional grounds, except for the uncertain effect of
the general idea of judicial reluctance to decide constitutional issues.
The theory that we have developed out of the Barrows case, which
did not involve administrative action, has been applied by the
Supreme Court, but not specifically articulated, in NLRB v. High-
land Park Mfg. Co.,9  involving review of administrative action.
The statute provided that "no complaint shall be issued pursuant to
a charge made by a labor organization .. .unless there is on file
with the Board an affidavit... by each officer of such labor organi-
97. The statement that the plaintiff has a "right" to sell to a Negro is
nothing more than the verbal elevation of an interest to a right. The right to
be free from a segregation ordinance runs in favor of- the Negro, not in favor
of the white, even though the white may be adversely affected by an in-
fringement of the Negro's right.
With more justification one could say that the retailer in Safeway Stores
v. Di Salle, 198 F. 2d 269 (D.C. Cir. 1952), had a "right" to be free from a
price ceiling lower than what is required by the statutory system designed to
protect farmers.
98. A good illustration grows out of United States v. Jeffers, 342 U. S.
48 (1951). The defendant in a criminal case sought exclusion of evidence
obtained by officers through illegal search of the hotel room of defendant's
aunts. One question was whether defendant had standing to assert the consti-
tutional rights of his aunts to be free from illegal search. The case went off
on the ground that defendant's property was seized in the search, and that
d.1fendant therefore had standing to obiect to both the search and the seizure.
Apart from the seizure question, the Court could properly on its own motion
prevent the use of evidence obtained illegally, and therefore the defendant
should have standing to call to the Court's attention the illegality. The reasons
for excluding evidence obtained through illegal search of others' property
are the same as the reasons for excluding evidence obtained through illegal
search of the defendant's property.
99. 341 U. S. 322 (1951).
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zation ... that he is not a member of the Communist Party ... "
The Board had sought enforcement in the court of appeals of an
order requiring an employer to bargain with a union affiliated with
the CIO, whose officers at the time had not filed the required affi-
davit. To the contention that the employer lacked standing to assert
in the reviewing court the failure of CIO officers to file the required
affidavit, the Supreme Court responded: "It would be strange in-
deed if the courts were compelled to enforce without inquiry an
order which could only result from proceedings that, under the
admitted facts, the Board was forbidden to conduct. The Board is
a statutory agency, and, when it is forbidden to investigate or enter-
tain complaints in certain circumstances, its final order could hard-
ly be valid. We think the contention is without merit and that an
issue of law of this kind, which goes to the heart of the validity of
the proceedings on which the order is based, is open to inquiry by
the courts when they are asked to lend their enforcement powers to
an administrative tribunal.''
Both the result and the explanation are entirely sound. That
the employer lacked either a legal right or the type of interest in
the required affidavit that is ordinarily necessary for standing to
initiate a proceeding is not and should not be a reason for denying
standing to call to the court's attention an infirmity which the court
on its own motion may properly take into account in refusing
enforcement.
Whenever the NLRB asks for enforcement of its order, there-
fore, the reviewing court may refuse enforcement if the court finds
the order invalid on any ground, whether or not the employer who is
resisting enforcement would have standing to initiate a review pro-
ceeding to challenge the validity of the order. The same is true in
any case in which the employer initiates a proceeding for review
and the Board counters with a petition for an order of enforcement.
Only if the Board fails to ask the court for an order of enforcement
may the problem arise concerning an employer's standing to chal-
lenge the validity of the Board's order-and the Board seeks en-
forcement in all or nearly all cases considered by a reviewing court.
If the Highland Park case had come to the reviewing court on a
petition by the employer for review, and if the Board had not filed
the usual petition for enforcement, then the court would have had
to face the problem of the employer's standing to challenge the
order on the ground of failure to file the required non-Communist
affidavit. But even if the court were to hold that the employer lacks
100. 341 U. S. at pages 325-326.
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standing to challenge on that ground, the employer could still win
by refusing compliance with the order, compelling the Board to
seek enforcement, and resisting enforcement as in the Highland
Park case.
§ S. STANDING OF PARTIEs BEFORE AGENCY; RELATION BETWEEN
STANDING AND INTERVENTION
Four questions must be carefully distinguished: (1) standing of
those who are already parties to raise particular questions in an
administrative proceeding, (2) standing to intervene in an ad-
ministrative proceeding, (3) standing to obtain judicial review of
administrative action, and (4) standing to resist enforcement of
administrative action.
We have seen in the preceding section that one who lacks stand-
ing to obtain judicial review of administrative action may have
standing to resist enforcement of administrative action in a review-
ing court. Similarly, one who lacks standing to obtain judicial re-
view may have standing to raise a question in the administrative
proceeding.
Those who are already parties to an administrative proceeding
may be denied standing to raise particular questions that do not
concern them. But a party who will be adversely affected by a par-
ticular course of action ought always to have standing to assert that
that course of action will be in excess of the agency's statutory
power or unconstitutional.
For example, in the Safeway Stores case,101 the court held that
the retailer had no standing to get review on the ground that the
Administrator had violated a statutory provision designed for the
protection of farmers. Whether or not that result is sound-and we
have presented the reasons for believing that it may be unsound- 2
-the retailer probably still should have standing to raise the same
question before the Administrator. Standing of a party to raise a
question before the agency is quite different from standing to ob-
tain judicial review. One who seeks review has the burden of
setting the judicial machinery in motion, and the court has no
power to initiate the proceeding on its own motion. One who ob-
jects before the administrative agency is not setting machinery in
motion but is trying to influence the course of action that is already
in process, and the agency of its own motion may properly avoid
an illegal course, whether the illegality will injure parties before
101. Safeway Stores v. Di Salle, 198 F. 2d 269 (Ema. Ct 1952), dis-
cussed above in section 6.
102. See discussion above at pages 372-374.
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the agency or parties who are not before the agency. And so, even
if the retailer had no standing to get review in the Safeway Stores
case, the retailer, being already a party to the administrative pro-
ceeding, had standing to point out to the Administrator that a low
enough ceiling would violate the statutory provision designed to
protect farmers. Whether or not the retailer called that provision
to the attention of the Administrator, the Administrator had the
obligation to avoid a violation of it.
One who is already a party may thus object to action in excess
of the agency's power even though the objector's rights are not
infringed. But may one who has no standing to obtain review be-
come a party to the administrative proceeding? The answer is
that the rules governing intervention are quite different from the
rules governing standing to obtain review.
Intervention in administrative proceedings is controlled by law
at four levels-statutory provisions, agency rules, agency practices,
and judicial decisions. Statuto y provisions are usually mere grants
of power and seldom answer significant questions. The Federal
Trade Commission Act is typical: "Any person . . . may make
application, and upon good cause shown may be allowed by the
Commission to intervene and appear in said proceeding by counsel
or in person."'10 The Public Utility Holding Company Act puts
unusual emphasis on public interest: "The Commission, in ac-
cordance with such rules and regulations as it may prescribe, shall
admit as a party any interested State, State Commission, State
securities commission, municipality, or other political subdivision
of a State, and may admit as a party any representative of interested
consumers or security holders, or any other person whose partici-
pation in the proceedings may be in the public interest or for the
protection of investors or consumers."' 0 4 One of the broadest pro-
visions is that of the Federal :Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act: "At
the hearing any interested person may be heard in person or by his
representative."'0 5 The statute that has given rise to the most
103. 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 45(b). The National Labor
Relations Act brings in subordinates: "In the discretion of the member,
agent, or agency conducting the hearing or the Board, any other person
may be allowed to intervene in the said proceeding and to present testimony."
48 Stat. 926 (1934), as amended, 61 Stat. 146 (1947), 29 U. S. C. A. §
160(b).
104. 48 Stat. 832 (1935), 15 U. S. C. A. § 79s. The Federal Power
Act is substantially similar. 49 StaL. 858 (1935), 16 U. S. C. A. § 825g.
105. 52 Stat. 1055 (1938), 21 U. S. C. A. § 371 (e). The Interstate Com-
merce Act provides with respect to both administrative and judicial proceed-
ings that "it shall be lawful to include as parties, in addition to the carrier,
all persons interested in or affected by the rate, regulation or practice. . .
32 Stat. 848 (1903), 49 U. S. C. A. § 42.
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troublesome problems about intervention, the Federal Communica-
tions Act, contains no provision about intervention but allows par-
ties in interest to protest and in proper cases to be heard.'08
Although rules of practice of regulatory agencies characteristi-
cally leave specific problems for agency discretion, the rules usually
recognize that intervention need not be completely granted or
completely denied but that limited participation may be permitted.
The FTC provides that the Commission may permit intervention
"to such extent and upon such terms as it shall deem proper." 0 7
The CAB provides that "any person... may appear at any hearing
and present any evidence which is relevant to the issues. Such per-
sons may also suggest questions or interrogatories to be propounded
by public counsel ... With the consent of the examiner, or of the
Board ... such persons may also cross-examine witnesses direct-
ly."1108 The SEC allows a discretionary "leave to be heard" which
may or may not include leave to call witnesses, to file briefs, to
submit proposed findings, and to make oral argument. Admission
as a party requires a finding that admission will be in the public
interest, and either that a limited leave to be heard would be in-
adequate or that the petitioner in proceedings under the Securities
Exchange Act may be "aggrieved." 09 Unlike other agencies, the
106. 66 Stat. 715 (1952), 47 U. S. C. A. § 309(c), providing for "pro-
test" by "any party in interest." The legislative history makes clear that the
intent was that those having standing for judicial review should be entitled to
protest. See Sen. Rep. No. 44, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1951).
See Note, Standing to Protest Before the FCC, Col. 55 L. Rev. 209 (1955).
107. FTC Rules of Prac., 16 C. F. R. § 2.9 (1949). The NLRB has a
similar provision, except that the discretion is that of the Regional Director
or the trial examiner. NLRB Rules and Regulations, Series 5, 29 C. F. R.§ 102.29 (1952 Supp.).
108. CAB Rules of Prac., 14 C. F. R. § 302.14 (1953). This provision is
used to mitigate the effect of denying intervention. Intervention is denied
unless the petitioner "has a statutory right to be made a party," or "will be
conducive to the ends of justice and will not unduly impede the conduct of
the Board's business." § 302.15.
109. SEC Rules of Prac., 17 C. F. R. § 201.17 (1949).
The FPC Rules of Prac., 18 C. F. R. § 1.8 (1949), provide that an inter-
est making intervention appropriate may be (1) a right conferred by statute,
(2) an interest which may be directly affected and which is not adequately
represented by existing parties and as to which petitioners may be bound
by the Commission's action in the proceeding, including consumers, security
holders, and competitors, and (3) any other interest of such a nature that
petitioner's participation may be in the public interest. Other agencies might
find advantageous this peculiar provision of the FPC rules: "Where there
are two or more interveners having substantially like interests and positions,
the Commission or presiding officer may, in order to expedite the hearing,
arrange appropriate limitations on the number of attorneys who will be
permitted to cross-examine and make and argue motions and objections on
behalf of such interveners."
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ICC permits a broadening of the issues so long as they are not
"unduly broadened." The ICC rules also provide that in various
designated proceedings, "an appearance may be entered ... with-
out filing a petition in intervention or other pleading" in certain
circumstances, and that one for whom an appearance is entered
"becomes a party to the proceeding."' 10
The most significant Supreme Court decision on intervention in
an administrative proceeding is FCC v. NBC (KOA),"'1 holding
(4-2) that a station, whose license is in substance modified by the
grant of a license to another to broadcast on the same frequency,
must be given full right of intervention, not a mere right of limited
participation.
Since both standing to obtain review and the right to intervene
in an administrative proceeding involve a determination of what
interests are deserving of legal protection, one might initially sup-
pose that the law governing intervention and standing would be
about the same. But many factors affect one and not the other.
Statutes concerning intervention usually differ from those concern-
ing review. The central problem of intervention is usually the dis-
advantage to the tribunal and to other parties of extended cross-
examination; judicial review involves no such problem. Adequate
protection for interests obliquely affected may often be afforded
through limited participation; no such compromise concerning judi-
cial review is customary. No constitutional restrictions affect inter-
vention; standing to obtain review is substantially affected by the
constitutional requirement of case or controversy. Intervention
means mere participation in a proceeding already initiated by
others; obtaining judicial review normally means instituting an
entirely new judicial proceeding.
In 1924 the Supreme Court held in an opinion by Mr. Justice
Brandeis: "The plaintiffs may challenge the order because they are
parties to it.... No case has been found in which either this court,
or any lower court, has denied to one who was a party to the pro-
ceedings before the Commission the right to challenge the order
entered therein. 11 2 The statute, the Court said, ".. .declares that
any party to a proceeding before the commission may, as of right,
become a party to 'any suit wherein is involved the validity of such
110. ICC Rules of Prac., 49 C. F. R. § 1.73 (1949). For an excellent
treatment of agency practices concerning intervention, see Att'y Gen. Comm.
Ad. Proc. Monograph, FCC 16-21 (1940). The problem of lengthy cross-
examination is evidently more acute in the FCC than in other agencies.
111. 319 U. S. 239 (1943). See the discussion of the Court's treatment
of the standing question, above at pages 366-367.
112. Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258, 267, 268 (1924).
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order.' The section does not in terms provide that such party may
institute a suit to challenge the order. But this is implied. For, other-
wise, there would in some cases be no redress for the injury in-
flicted by an illegal order."11 3
Six years later the Supreme Court, again speaking through Mr.
Justice Brandeis, took a diametrically opposite position concerning
the same statute: "The mere fact that appellant was permitted to
intervene before the Commission does not entitle it to institute an
independent suit to set aside the Commission's order in the absence
of resulting actual or threatened legal injury to it."114 Indeed, the
Court held that even a clear right to intervene was insufficient to
confer standing to obtain review. Other cases have held that parties
to an administrative proceeding may be without standing to obtain
review.1 1r The cases apparently have not picked up the idea that
judicial review should sometimes be allowed because a party to
an administrative proceeding may be bound by res judicata: 1 6
Largely undeveloped by case law is the question whether stand-
ing to obtain review necessarily carries with it a right of interven-
tion. Perhaps the most significant authority is the reasoning of a
court of appeals: "It is said that the Commission is authorized to
permit or deny intervention at its discretion and that, since these
petitioners had no right to intervene, they can have no right to judi-
cial review. The Commission itself admits, however, that it may not
abuse its discretion. This, to us, means that there are some persons
who have a right to participate in Commission proceedings and
some who do not. We think it clear that any person who would be
'aggrieved' by the Commission's order, such as a competitor, is also
a person who has a right to intervene. Otherwise, judicial review,
113. 264 U. S. at pages 267-268.
114. Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry. v. United States, 281 U. S. 479, 486(1930).
115. Boston Tow Boat Co. v. United States, 321 U. S. 632 (1944);
Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U. S. 113 (1940) ; Moffat Tunnel League v.
United States, 289 U. S. 113 (1933); Alexander Sprunt & Son, Inc. v.
United States, 281 U. S. 249 (1930).
But where a statute confers what the Court calls "an absolute right to
intervene," the'provision also carries a right of appeal. Brotherhood of
Railroad Trainmen v. B. & 0. R. R., 331 U. S. 519 (1947).
116. The Court so reasoned in Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock Corp.,
328 U. S. 275 (1946), with respect to a judicial proceeding in which a party
had been allowed to intervene. But of course the principle of res judicata
may often be equally applicable to administrative proceedings. See Davis, Ad-
ministrative Law, Ch. 14 (1951). Rules of practice sometimes provide that
leave to intervene shall not be deemed a finding that the intervening party is
entitled to review. E.g., CAB Rules of Prac. § 285.6 (1946). Administrative
orders allowing intervention often provide explicitly that the orders do not
confer standing to obtain review. Interstate Electric v. FPC, 164 F. 2d 485(9th Cir. 1947).
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which may be had only by a party to the proceedings before the
Commission who has been 'aggrieved' by its order, could be denied
or unduly forestalled by the Commission merely by denying inter-
vention. ' " 7 This reasoning applies only when the statute limits
review to a "party" aggrieved. Probably the reason for the scanti-
ness of authority is that agencies almost always allow intervention
by those entitled to obtain review. One unresolved question of im-
portance is whether or not a broadcasting station having an eco-
nomic interest as a competitor of an applicant for a license is en-
titled to full rights of intervention in the license proceeding ;118 the
Supreme Court in the Sander," case recognized the standing of such
a party to obtain review as a representative of the public interest.119
Of course, the question whether or not an intervener in a judi-
cial proceeding reviewing administrative action may appeal to a
higher court is quite different from the question whether or not an
intervener in an administrative proceeding may obtain judicial re-
view. Thus, the Supreme Court's holding that a union which had
been permitted to intervene in a proceeding before a reviewing
court had standing to petition the Supreme Court for review 20
is not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holding that a union
has no standing to enforce an order of the Board. 2 '
§ 9. STANDING OF TAXPAYERS TO CHALLENGE PUBLIC
EXPENDITURES
Under the doctrine of Frothingham v. Mellon'2_2 (commonly
cited as Massachusetts v. Mellon) the law of the federal courts is
clear that a federal taxpayer has no standing to challenge the legal-
ity of a federal expenditure. Although this doctrine is deeply em-
bedded, the combined effect of four rather solid propositions makes
it highly vulnerable: (1) Reasons relied upon by the Supreme
Court in the Frothingham opinion are contrary to the facts about
our present tax system; (2) the law of the state courts is over-
"whelmingly and even almost uniformly opposed to the Supreme
Court's doctrine; (3) the fact that the Supreme Court before de-
117. National Coal Ass'n v. Federal Power Commission, 191 F. 2d 462,
466-467 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
118. See Warner, Radio and Television Law § 13d (1948).
119. FCC v. Sanders Bros., W09 U. S. 470 (1940), discussed fully above
at pages 363-365.
120. International Union of Mine, Mill, and Smelter Workers v. Eagle-
Picher Co., 325 U. S. 335 (1945) ; cf. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305
U. S. 197, 218 (1938).
121. Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309
U. S. 261 (1940).
122. 262 U. S. 447 (1923).
[Vol. 39:353
STANDING
veloping the Frothingharn doctrine upheld the standing of federal
taxpayers shows that nothing in the Constitution compels the
denial of such standing; and (4) to the extent that a taxpayer is
denied standing to challenge administrative action in making an
expenditure which adversely affects the taxpayer in fact, the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act is violated.
In the Frothingham case, the Court held that a payer of federal
taxes has no standing to challenge the constitutionality of a program
of federal grants in aid to states for maternity hospitals. The Court
said that the taxpayer's interest in the moneys of the Treasury "is
comparatively minute and indeterminable; and the effect upon
future taxation, of any payment out of the funds, so remote, fluctu-
ating and uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal to the
preventive powers of a court of equity."' 23 To have standing, the
Court said, the challenger must show "that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result
of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite
way in common with people generally.' 1 24
In the same opinion the Court recognized that municipal tax-
payers may challenge the validity of municipal expenditures: "The
interest of a taxpayer of a municipality in the application of its
moneys is direct and immediate and the remedy by injunction to
prevent their misuse is not inappropriate. It is upheld by a large
number of state cases and is the rule of this Court."'
25
The Court's major idea that a municipal taxpayer has a larger
and more direct stake in a municipal expenditure than a federal
taxpayer has in a federal expenditure may have been sound in 1923
but is now contrary to the facts. General Motors in a recent year
paid well over a billion dollars in federal taxes. This means that
General Motors has about a two per cent stake in every federal
expenditure. When the Federal Government undertakes a program
involving expenditure of ten billion dollars, the General Motors
portion is about two hundred million dollars-hardly a "minute"
sum in an absolute sense. Even if General Motors or some other
corporation has more than a two per cent share in the expenditures
of some municipality, its stake cannot possibly reach such an
amount as two hundred million dollars.
If the size of the tax is the criterion, as the Court assumes in the
Frothingham opinion, then it would be sensible to hold that federal
123. 262 U. S. at page 487.
124. 262 U. S. at page 488.
125. 262 U. S. at page 486.
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taxpayers may challenge federal expenditures and that municipal
taxpayers may not challenge municipal expenditures. The Court in
1923 failed to take account of what is more fully realized more than
three decades later-that the rates of federal taxes have no counter-
part in state and local taxation. Furthermore, the tax base for
federal taxes is typically many times as large as the tax base for
state or municipal taxes.
On the ground upon which it was decided, the Frothinghant
case does not seem to stand analysis.
Most impressive is the almost uniformly adverse reaction of
state courts to the doctrine of the case. A 1929 collection of cases
showed nineteen states which at that time held that state taxpayers
could challenge state expenditures and only four that denied such
standing to state taxpayers.1 2 6 At the present time, probably at
least thirty-two states uphold the standing of state taxpayers, and
in not a single state is the law clear that state taxpayers have no
standing to challenge state expenditures. This means that since
1929, about thirteen states have for the first time upheld such
standing,127 and that each of the four states which previously had
denied such standing has developed law which either upholds such
standing or renders the law unclear.
The four states that formerly denied standing of a state tax-
payer deserve special attention. Louisiana, expressly overruling an
earlier case, now recognizes such standing.'28 New Mexico's 1926
The Court cited Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U. S. 601, 609 (1879). The
Court said at the page cited: "Of the right of resident tax-payers to invoke
the interposition of a court of equity to prevent an illegal disposition of the
moneys of the county or the illegal creation of a debt which they in common
with other property-holders of the county may otherwise be compelled to
pay, there is at this day no serious question."
But compare Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 429 (1952),
which denied standing of township taxpayers to challenge a practice which
their taxes supported, even though the state court had upheld the standing
of the taxpayers.
126. 58 A. L. R. 588 (1929).
127. Turnipseed v. Blan, 226 Ala. 548, 148 So. 116 (1933) ; Ethington
v. Wright, 66 Ariz. 382, 189 P. 2d 209 (1948) ; Aiken v. Armistead, 186 Ga.
385, 198 S. E. 237 (1938) ; Wartz v. Shane, 216 Ia. 771, 249 N. W. 661 (1933) ;
Standard Printing Co. v. Miller, 304 Ky. 49, 199 S. IV. 2d 731 (1946) ("con-
ceding but not deciding" that taxpayer has standing) ; Borden v. Louisiana
State Board of Education, 168 La. 1016, 123 So. 655 (1929) ; Chance v.
Mississippi State Textbook Board. 190 Miss. 476, 200 So. 713 (1941) ; Teer
v. Jordan, 232 N. C. 48, 59 S. E. 2d 359 (1950) ; Herr v. Rudolf, 75 N. D. 91,
25 N. W. 2d 916 (1947) ; City of Austin v. Thompson, 147 Tex. 639, 219
S. W. 2d 57 (1949); Lyon v. Bateman, 228 P. 2d 818 (Utah 1951)
(standing denied because of lack of showing of expenditure affecting tax-
payer's pecuniary interest); Democrat Printing Co. v. Zimmerman, 245
Wis. 406, 14 N. W. 2d 428 (1944); Spriggs v. Clark, 45 Wyo. 62, 14 P. 2d
667 (1932).
128. Borden v. Louisiana State Board of Education, 168 La. 1016, 123
So. 655 (1929), overruling Sutton v. Buie, 136 La. 234, 66 So. 956 (1914).
[Vol. 39:353
STANDING
case denying standing of a state taxpayer 12 9 was followed in 1947
in a case involving a municipal taxpayer,130 but in 1952 the New
Mexico court recognized standing of taxpayers to challenge the
teaching of religion in the public schools. 31 New York's denial of
standing to a state taxpayer in 19140 has been recently fol-
lowed,1 3 but at the same time the New York Court of Appeals has
indicated its willingness to overlook the problem of standing when
an issue of unusual importance is presented, 3 4 and a citizen and
resident of New York often has standing to challenge state action. 3 5
In 1947 the State of Washington court seemingly modified its doc-
trine when it declared: "We have never held that, in a proper case
where the attorney general refused to act to protect the public
interest, a taxpayer could not do so.'"'13 A taxpayer thus gains
standing, except that he must first request the attorney general to
institute a proceeding.
In 1899 the Supreme Court did not hesitate to pass upon a con-'
stitutional question raised by "a citizen and taxpayer of the United
States and a resident of the District of Columbia." '37 The suit was
to enjoin the Treasurer of the United States from making a dis-
bursement to a District of Columbia hospital, and the argument
was that the legislation authorizing the disbuisement was unconsti-
tutional. The defendant demurred in the lower court on the ground
that the complainant had shown no right to maintain the bill. The
Supreme Court nevertheless decided the merits of the constitutional
issue. But that was before the Supreme Court had developed its
artificial doctrine about standing.
129. Asplund v. Hannett, 31 N. M. 641, 249 Pac. 1074 (1926).
130. Sierra Electric Cooperative v. Town of Hot Springs, 51 N. M.
150, 180 P. 2d 244 (1947).
131. Miller v. Cooper, 56 N. M. 355, 244 P. 2d 520 (1952).
132. Schieffelin v. Komfort, 212 N. Y. 520, 106 N. E. 675 (1914).
133. Bull v. Stichman, 273 App. Div. 311, 78 N. Y. S. 2d 279 (1948),
affirmed 298 N. Y. 516, 80 N. E. 2d 661, 300 N. Y. 460, 88 N. E. 2d 325
(1949).
134. Kuhn v. Curran, 294 N. Y. 207, 61 N. E. 2d 513 (1945).
135. Andresen v. Rice, 277 N. Y. 271, 14 N. E. 2d 65 (1938) ; Cash v.
Bates, 301 N. Y. 258, 93 N. E. 2d 835 (1950).
136. Reiter v. Wallgren, 28 Wash. 2d 872, 184 P. 2d 571, 573 (1947).
The court had seemed to hold in State ex rel. Pierce County v. Superior
Court, 86 Wash. 685, 151 Pac. 108 (1915) that a state taxpayer was without
standing to challenge a state expenditure.
On the basis of the opinion in the Reiter case, a taxpayer probably may
make the attorney general the defendant in a mandamus proceeding to com-
pel the attorney general to take action to prevent unlawful expenditure of
public funds.
137. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U. S. 291 (1899). The case cannot be
explained away by saying that the District of Columbia, whose expenditure
was challenged, is comparable to a municipality. The plaintiff did not sue as
a taxpayer of the District of Columbia, but as "a citizen and taxpayer of
the United States and a resident of the District of Columbia."
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Even as late as 1915 the Supreme Court considered a constitu-
tional issue at the instance of "a property owner and taxpayer."' ' 1
A New York statute gave a preference in employment of persons
on public works to citizens of New York and of the United States,
and contracts for public construction permitted cancellation for
violation of the requirement. When the Public Service Commission
threatened a cancellation, "a property owner and taxpayer" sued
to enjoin the commissioners, arguing unconstitutionality. The Su-
preme Court disposed of the question of standing in three sentences:
"There seems to have been no question raised as to the right of
Heim to maintain the suit, although he is not one of the contractors
nor a laborer of the excluded nationality or citizenship. The Ap-
pellate Division felt that there might be objection to the right,
under the holding of a cited case. The Court of Appeals, however,
made no comment, and we must-certainly may-assume that Heim
had a right of suit; and, so assuming, we pass to the merits."'13
The federal doctrine that a taxpayer may not challenge an ex-
penditure applies not only to a challenge of constitutionality of
legislation but also to legality of administrative action. Yet the
Administrative Procedure Act permits judicial review of adminis-
trative action at the instance o:[ one who is "adversely affected,' 40
and both the Senate and the House committees said that this means
adversely affected in fact.' 41 If this intent behind the APA is to be
carried out, a federal taxpayer should have standing to challenge the
legality of an administrative expenditure if he can show that he is
adversely affected in fact.
The principal argument for denial of standing to a federal tax-
payer to challenge a federal expenditure emphasizes the idea that
we don't want the courts cluttered with cases in which taxpayers
138. Heim v. McCall, 239 U. S. 175 (1915).
139. 239 U. S. at pages 186-187.
The holding with respect to standing seems to be discussed with ap-
proval by the court in Coleman v. M¢iller, 207 U. S. 433, 445 (1939). And in
the same case four justices cited the case in support of the proposition that
"while the ordinary state taxpayer's suit is not recognized in the federal
courts, it affords adequate standing for review of state decisions when so
recognized by state courts." 307 U. S. at page 465. This statement is especial-
ly interesting in view of the fact that in the Heim case the taxpayer's objec-
tion was not to expenditure but to discrimination.
That the Supreme Court is unwilling or unable to follow its own doctrine
as declared in Coleman v. Miller is shown by Doremus v. Board of Education,
342 U. S. 429 (1952), where plaintiffs who were both state and municipal
taxpayers were held to have no standing to raise a constitutional issue in
the Supreme Court even though t ie state court had considered their case
on the merits.
For other such cases involving problems of standing and federalism,
see the discussion below at pages 423-427.
140. Section 10(a).
141. Sen. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 212, 276 (1946).
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are challenging every little expenditure. For instance, in Laughlin
v. Reynolds,7'Y "an attorney and taxpayer" sought mandamus to
evict the Bar Association of the District of Columbia from space
used for library purposes in the building occupied by the federal
district court. The case was disposed of on the ground of lack of
standing, and few will quarrel with the result. But one may still
wonder whether a better ground for decision would have been un-
reviewability of the discretion exercised in allowing use of the
library space.
Similarly, those who support the Frothingham doctrine assert
that Congress should be the sole judge of the manner in which tax-
payers' money is to be spent. But the result of the Frothingham
doctrine is to refuse to kill the argument that many of our major
spending programs are unconstitutional, even though no one has
standing to raise the constitutional issue. If taxpayers' suits to chal-
lenge such programs should be discouraged, perhaps the sound. way
to discourage them would be by deciding on the merits of the con-
stitutional issue that Congress has a full power under the Constitu-
tion to tax and to spend to provide for the general welfare. 143
Because we are so far committed to the institution of judicial
review of legislation, the spending programs that are constitutional
might be more firmly based if they were bolstered by Supreme
Court interpretations of the congressional spending power. 44
Rightly or wrongly, we have evolved a system of relying upon
courts to keep Congress and administrative officers within their
powers. The reasons for such reliance upon courts are no better
and no worse when the validity of spending is challenged than when
the validity of other governmental action is challenged.
§ 10. STANDING OF TAXPAYERS ON NoN-FIscAL ISSUES, OF
CITIZENS, AND OF RESIDENTS
In contrast with the federal courts, many state courts recognize
the standing of citizens, of residents, and of persons described as
142. 196 F. 2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
143. Article I, section 8: "The Congress shall have Power To lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for
the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States."
144. That Congress has a full power to tax and spend to provide for
the general welfare is shown by such cases as Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis, 301 U. S. 548 (1937); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 619 (1937);
City of Cleveland v. United States, 323 U. S. 329 (1945). The Cleveland
case upheld the power of Congress to enact the United States Housing Act
of 1937, and the other two cases upheld aspects of the Social Security Act
of 1935. The three cases together probably supersede United States v. Butler,
297 U. S. 1 (1936), holding that Congress could not use the spending power
to regulate agricultural production.
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"citizens and taxpayers" to challenge administrative action. Stand-
ing of taxpayers is very common, even when the issue is non-fiscal
and therefore has nothing to do with the amount of public expendi-
tures or with the amount of taxes to be paid. The effect of this
batch of cases is to say that one who has status as a member of the
public has standing to challenge the administrative action.
An outstanding example o£ this attitude is that of the New York
Court of Appeals in the 1945 decision in Kuhn v. Curran.1 4 The
petitioner was "a resident and taxpayer." The challenged statute
altered the state into ten judicial districts and contained provisions
concerning numbers of justices and of stenographers and clerks.
The court dealt with the problem of standing in two sentences: "In
view of the importance to the public of an authoritative determina-
tion of that question at the present time, we do not pause to con-
sider whether the question is presented in appropriate proceedings.
Sufficient, at present, that a controversy exists between the parties
to the proceedings immediately affecting them, and that all parties
entitled to be heard in regard to the questions involved are here
represented."' 14 6 The court then considered the merits of the con-
stitutional issue.
Some other New York cases are similarly liberal. In Andresen
v. Rice,147 the legislature had placed the state police force in non-
competitive or unclassified service, and one who had not applied
for a position on the force challenged the constitutionality of the
legislation. The court justified the petitioner's standing by pointing
out that "He is of age to make such application, but, more than
that, he is a citizen and resident of the state of New York, and, being
such, is capable of presenting to the courts his petition for the en-
forcement by officials of their mandatory duties."14 s
In the 1950 case of Cash v. Bates, 49 some disabled veterans who
were ineligible for appointment were held to have standing to seek
removal from office of veterans with disability ratings of 0%
(meaning that their disabilities did not appreciably impair earning
capacity). The plaintiffs had disabilities of 10% or more, but they
were on an eligibility list that had expired. The court upheld the
plaintiffs' standing on the ground that "as citizens and taxpayers
145. 294 N. Y. 207,61 N. E. 2d 513 (1945).
146. 294 N. Y. at page 213, 61 N. E. 2d at page 515.
147. 277 N. Y. 271,14 N. E. 2d 65 (1938).
148. 277 N. Y. at page 281, 14 N. E. 2d at page 69.
149. 301 N. Y. 258, 93 N. E. 2d 835 (1950).
In McCabe v. Voorhis, 243 N. Y. 401, 153 N. E. 849 (1926), the court
held that "a resident and voter" could bring mandamus to compel the board
of elections to omit from a ballot a proposition for submission on referendum."
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they are entitled to an opportunity to insist" upon compliance
with the civil service laws.
A leading New York case is People ex rel. Pumpyanwky v.
Keating,'"0 upholding the standing of "a resident and citizen" to
challenge the validity of a license issued to a seller of newspapers
for a booth on a street comer. The court said that the relator "is
entitled to maintain this proceeding as a citizen," even though he
"makes no claim to a special interest."
By no means all of the New York cases are as liberal as the ones
here summarized,' 5 but that only shows that the barriers to stand-
ing can be largely broken down and the courts can still maintain a
discretionary control over the determination of standing problems.
Probably the litigation over problems of standing is less in New
York than it is in the federal courts.
Many of the New Jersey cases similarly allow standing to citi-
zens and taxpayers. In 1879 the court upheld the standing of a
citizen and taxpayer to require an officer to show him letters upon
which saloon licenses were issued.1 52 The court reasoned that the
right of examination depended upon the right to bring an action,
and that "an inhabitant and taxpayer" could litigate. The court
specifically met the fear of flooding the courts: "The general in-
difference of private individuals to public omissions and encroach-
ments, the fear of expense in unsuccessful and even in successful
litigation, and the discretion of the court, have been, and doubtless
will continue to be, a sufficient guard to these public officials against
too numerous and unreasonable attacks."' 58
Recent New Jersey law is shown by the Doremus case, 154 which
later went to the United States Supreme Court. A citizen and tax-
payer challenged the requirement of Bible reading in the public
schools. The New Jersey court considered the merits even though
150. 168 N. Y. 390,61 N. E. 637 (1901).
151. For instance, in Bull v. Stichman, 273 App. Div. 311, 78 N. Y. S.
2d 279, affirmed without opinion 298 N. Y. 516, 80 N. E. 2d 661 (1948), a
"citizen and taxpayer" was held to have no standing to challenge the un-
constitutionality of a public expenditure.
152. Ferry v. Williams, 41 N. J. L. 332 (1879).
Accord: Botts v. Wurts, 63 N. J. L. 289, 43 Atl. 744 (1899) ; Gimbel v.
Peabody, 114 N. J. L. 574, 178 Atl. 62 (1935) (citizen and taxpayer may
get review of township's establishment of a greyhound track) ; Stroud v.
Consumers' Water Co., 56 N. J. L. 422, 28 Atl. 578 (1894) (payer of poll
tax may challenge ordinance authorizing purchase of water works). In
Simmons v. Mayor of Wenonah, 6 N. 3. Misc. 902, 143 Atl. 73 (1928) one
who had no real property and had not yet paid personal property taxes was
held to have no standing as a taxpayer.
153. 41 N. J. L. at page 339.
154. Doremus v. Board of Education, 5 N. J. 435, 75 A. 2d 880 (1950),
appeal dismissed for lack of standing 342 U. S. 429 (1952).
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it acknowledged that no showing had been made that the require-
ment added to costs of the school.
In Massachusetts private citizens are allowed to challenge regu-
lations issued by the commissioner of public welfare. In Nichols v.
Commissioner,'5 the petitioners were "private citizens" who were
seeking "the vindication of a public right which, in this instance, is
the due execution of the laws of this Commonwealth. . . . They
neither have nor represent any private interest."'15 6 The court up-
held their standing, citing many Massachusetts cases.
In Pettengell v. Alcoholic: Beverages Control Commission,21
7
"registered voters and taxpayers" had standing to compel the com-
mission to revoke a liquor license issued in excess of a quota.
In a 1951 Massachusetts case the plaintiffs were eleven citizens
of the Commonwealth "interested in the execution of laws," seeking
mandamus again'st state officers. 58 The court reviewed the Massa-
chusetts cases holding that where no private interest is asserted a
citizen has standing to assert a question of "public right." The
principle, the court said, was "fully established."
In 1888 the Minnesota court declared that "the great weight
of American authority is that where the object is, as in these cases,
to enforce a public duty ... any private person may move to en-
force it."'1 9 The plaintiffs were described as "freeholders, tax-
payers, and legal voters," and they were held to have standing to
raise the question whether officers should be required to move their
offices from one village to another. In 1950 the same court with the
greatest of ease held that "a taxpayer may . . . maintain an action
... to restrain illegal action on the part of public officials," without
showing a special interest.1 60
In 1954 members of a bar association challenged the validity of
the Minnesota governor's veto of a legislative enactment increasing
155. 311 Mass. 125, 40 N. E. 2d 275 (1942).
156. 311 Mass. at page 130, 40 N. E. 2d at page 278.
157. 295 Mass. 473, 4 N. E. 2d 324 (1936), relying upon Brooks v.
Secretary of the Commonwealth, 257 Mass. 91, 153 N. E. 322 (1926).
158. 327 Mass. 310, 98 N. E. 2d 621 (1951).
But compare Finlay v. City of Boston, 196 Mass. 267, 82 N. E. 5
(1907) ; Chandler v. Railroad Commissioners, 141 Mass. 208, 5 N. E. 509(1886) ; McGlue v. Essex County Commissioners, 225 Mass. 59, 113 N. E.
742 (1916); Mullholland v. State Racing Commission, 295 Mass. 286, 3
N. E. 2d 773 (1936).
The Massachusetts court commonly assumes standing without discussion.
Amory v. Assessors of Boston, 306 Mass. 354, 28 N. E. 2d 436 (1940) :
Allydon Realty Corp. v. Holyoke Housing Authority, 304 Mass. 288, 23
N. E. 2d 665 (1939).
159. Currie v. Weld, 39 Minn. 426, 40 N. W. 561 (1888).
160. Phillips v. Brandt, 231 Minn. 423, 43 N. W. 2d 285 (1950).
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the salaries of judges.'0 ' The Minnesota court considered the merits
of the constitutional issue without mentioning the question whether
the plaintiffs had standing to raise the issue. The action is in line
with many cases in other states in which the courts adverted to the
standing question. One may surmise that the cases are numerous
in all jurisdictions in which the court does not bother to state who
are the parties plaintiff, thereby concealing what might otherwise
be a significant problem of standing.' 6 -2
South Dakota follows a practice like that of Minnesota, having
held as early as 1896 that "any taxpayer or elector may apply for
and obtain a writ of mandamus, in a proper case, to enforce the
performance of such public duty."'1 3 One described as a "citizen
of the United States and a resident, freeholder, taxpayer and elec-
tor" was held to have standing to compel a board to submit to voters
a question of location of the county seat. In 1952 the South Dakota
court, holding that residents, citizens, and taxpayers could sue to
cancel a public grant of an easement, declared: "It is settled law
of this state that a taxpayer or elector having no special interest
may institute an action to protect a public right."164 The cases in
Nebraska6 5 and New Mexico'166 are substantially similar. In Cali-
fornia ,17 "a citizen of the United States and a resident and tax-
payer" of a city and county, who had filed an application for appoint-
ment as a notary public, had standing in a mandate proceeding to
force the governor to exercise his discretion to appoint notaries
public for the city and county.
The various state cases reviewed in this section contrast sharply
with the attitude of the federal courts. Indeed, the experience in
161. State ex rel. Gardner v. Holm-, 62 N. W. 2d 52 (Minn. 1954).
162. The Supreme Court in Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 485(1952) failed to state who the plaintiffs were even though a dissenting justice
asserted that the plaintiffs lacked standing.
163. Adkins v. Lien, 9 S. D. 297, 68 N. W. 748 (1896).
164. Lien v. Northwestern Engineering Co., 74 S. D. 476, 54 N. W. 2d
472 (1952).
165. Rein v. Johnson, 149 Neb. 67, 30 N. V. 2d 548 (1947), certiorari
denied 335 U. S. 814 (1948) (resident taxpayers may enjoin expenditure
without showing special interest peculiar to themselves) ; Lynch v. City of
Omaha, 153 Neb. 147, 43 N. W. 2d 589 (1950) (resident taxpayer, pursuant
to statutory authorization, may defend suit on behalf of city) ; Nobel v. City
of Lincoln, 153 Neb. 79, 43 N. W. 2d 578 (1950) (taxpayers may force city
council to proceed with construction of municipal auditorium and restrain
holding of election).
166. Zellers v. Huff, 55 N. M. 501, 236 P. 2d 949 (1951) (citizens,
taxpayers, and parents of schoolchildren may enjoin teaching of religion in
public schools) ; Miller v. Cooper, 56 N. M. 355, 244 P. 2d 420 (1952) (tax-
payers alone have standing to enjoin teaching of religion, court assuming
standing on authority of Zellers case).
167. Hollman v. Varren, 32 Cal. 2d 351, 196 P. 2d 562 (1948).
1955]
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these state courts raises the question-and even goes far toward
answering the question-whether the federal courts have too readily
assumed that opening the judicial doors to those who are earnestly
trying to prevent illegal official action is dangerous to the integrity
of the judicial process. If any special evils flow from the extreme
liberality of these state courts .on the problem of standing, the evils
are not apparent in the reported opinions. The courts are not flooded
by cases brought by officious intermeddlers, and no sign appears
that the adversary system has been either destroyed or impaired.
§ 11. COMPETITORS
Should one whose only interest in administrative action is avoid-
ing new or increased competition or reducing existing competition
have standing to challenge the administrative action?
The answer to this question is generally yes in both the federal
courts and the state courts, but the answer is not wholly free from
unnecessary complication.
The Sanders decision is clear and authoritative. 16 An existing
radio station, though lacking a legal right, has standing to chal-
lenge an order of the FCC granting a certificate to a new competitor
station. The result does not rest upon peculiarities of competition
in radio broadcasting, for the Court emphasized that "the Act
recognizes that the field of broadcasting is one of free competition.
The sections dealing with broadcasting demonstrate that Congress
has not, in its regulatory scheme, abandoned the principle of free
competition, as it has done in the case of railroads.. ."09 Therefore
the Sanders case, decided by a unanimous Supreme Court and
further refined by two later Supreme Court decisions,170 is clear
and unequivocal in holding that when legislation has not changed
the basic system of free competition, a competitor does have stand-
ing to challenge administrative action which has an adverse effect
only in that new competition is authorized. Since the prevailing
policy of the law in absence of legislation favors competition, the
holding is a very strong one.
The Sanders case was decided under a statutory provision al-
lowing review upon application of a "person aggrieved or whose
interests are adversely affected." Since the Administration Proce-
168. FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U. S. 470 (1940),
further developed by Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U. S. 4 (1942),
and FCC v. NBC (KOA). 319 U. S. 239 (1943). All three cases are dis-
cussed above at pages 363-368.
169. 309 U. S. at page 474.
170. 3 Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U. S. 4 (1942), and FCC
v. NBC (KOA), 319 U. S. 239 (1943).
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dure Act allows judicial review upon application of "Any person
suffering legal wrong because of any agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by such action within the meaning of any
relevant statute," the Sanders doctrine is applicable to all adminis-
trative action subject to section 10(a) of the APA, and it should
be persuasive authority in the state courts whenever a statute pro-
vides for review at the instance of one who is "aggrieved or ad-
versely affected."
In absence of such a statutory provision, a competitor may lack
standing under cases such as Tennessee Electric Power Co. v.
TVA,' 7' which denied standing to eighteen power companies to
challenge the constitutionality of new competition through the TVA.
But, as we have seen above, 17 2 the reasoning of the Court in the
Tennessee Electric case is of questionable soundness and will not
necessarily be followed. 73 Even if it is followed, the exception from
the usual law that a competitor has standing is only a small one,
for the APA applies to nearly all reviewable administrative action
of federal agencies.
A rather significant case is National Coal Ass'n z. Federai
Powcr Commission, 7 4 holding a grant of a certificate of conveni-
ence and necessity under the Natural Gas Act to construct a pipeline
to Oak Ridge, Tennessee, could be challenged by (1) the National
Coal Association, a trade association of bituminous coal mine own-
ers and operators, some of whom were said to sell to the Oak Ridge
atomic energy plant, (2) the United Mine Workers of America, a
labor union of coal miners, including many allegedly employed in
mines supplying coal to the atomic energy plant, and (3) the Rail-
way Labor Executives Association, whose membership is composed
of the chief executive officers of unions whose members were al-
legedly employed by railroads competing with the pipelines as car-
171. 306 U.,S. 118 (1937).
172. See pages 360-361, supra.
173. Whether the Tennessee Electric case can be reconciled with Frost
v. Corporation Commission, 278 U. S. 515 (1929) is doubtful. One who had
been licensed to operate a cotton gin was held to have standing to challenge
the validity of a grant of a license to a competitor.
In Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U. S. 464, 484-485 (1938), the Court
made a curious explanation of the Frost case: "The difference between the
Frost case and this is fundamental; for the competition contemplated there
was unlawful while that of the municipalities contemplated here is entirely
lawful." Yet the court earlier in the Alabama Power Co. opinion had stated
the issue: "The ultimate question which, therefore, emerges is one of great
breadth. Can anyone who will suffer injurious consequences from the lawful
use of money about to be unlawfully loaned maintain a suit to enjoin the
loan?" 302 U. S. at page 480. The Frost holding may be based on better
wisdom than either the Tennessee Electric or the Alabama Power holding.
174. 191 F. 2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
1955]
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riers of fuel. The statute provided for judicial review at the instance
of "any party ... aggrieved . . ." The court recognized that the
standing of the petitioners rested upon injury to them from dis-
placement of coal by natural gas, loss of markets to the coal com-
panies, unemployment of miners and of railroad employees. The
court first upheld the standing of the National Coal Association
and then reasoned: "We see no reason, and none is suggested to
us, for considering the interest of employees in retention of their
employment in the competing companies as any less substantial
than the interest of competitors in retaining their markets or the
prospect of loss of employment any less direct and immediate than
the loss of markets with which the competing companies are threat-
ened."'175 The court relied heavily upon the "comprehensive dis-
cussion" by judge Frank in the Associated Industries caseY.17
Another strong case upholding standing of competitors is
American President Lines v. Federal Maritime Board,77 holding
that two competitors of a company to which the Board had awarded
subsidies could challenge the legality of the Board's action. The
opinion rests heavily upon the "adversely affected" provision of
the Administrative Procedure Act. The court specifically and cor-
rectly said that "The doctrine of Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes. ..
is not applicable to proceedings under the Administrative Procedure
Act." 7
8
In Atlantic Freight Lines v. Summerfield, 9 the court held that
a motor carrier competing with the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad had
no standing to enjoin the Postmaster General from issuing a stamp
commemorating the 125th anniversary of B. & 0. incorporation.
One can hardly quarrel with the result, but one may wonder
whether the holding would be more soundly based if the ground
for the decision had been unreviewability of the Postmaster Gen-
eral's discretion instead of lack of standing.
Food and Drug Administration cases raise in aggravated form
the problem of competitors' interests. The Act permits any person
"adversely affected" to get review. A manufacturer of corn syrup
had standing to challenge an order fixing a definition or a standard
of identity of sweetened condensed milk so as to forbid use of corn
syrup; the court thought the manufacturer could uphold the inter-
175. 191 F. 2d at page 464.
176. Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F. 2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943).
177. 112 F. Supp. 346 (D.C. 1953).
178. Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U. S. 464 (1938).
179. 204 F. 2d 64 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied 346 U. S. 828 (1953).
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est of consumers. s0 Butter producers had standing to contest an
order fixing a definition and standard of identity for oleomargarine,
although the court so held "with some misgivings."'' But producers
of cane sugar had no standing to object to an order permitting, with-
out disclosure on the label, the use of dextrose and corn syrup in
canned fruits; the injury to cane sugar producers resulted from a
prior requirement of disclosure on the label of use of dextrose and
corn syrup.8 2 A producer of lecithin had no standing to challenge
an order permitting processors of cacao products to use lecithin
without stating on the label that lecithin was used; the court pointed
out that the order did not prohibit disclosing on the label the use
of lecithin. 8 3 Undercutting all these cases, however, is a holding
that a consumer as such has standing to challenge an order per-
mitting use without disclosure on the label of synthetic as well as
natural sources of vitamin A in oleomargarine; the opinion is so
well grounded that problems of standing of competitors ought no
longer to arise in this field.'84
180. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. v. Secretary of Agriculture, 120 F. 2d 258
(7th Cir. 1941).
181. Land O'Lakes Creameries v. McNutt, 132 F. 2d 653 (8th Cir.
1943).
182. United States Cane Sugar Refiners' Ass'n v. McNutt, 138 F. 2d
116 (2d Cir. 1943).
183. American Lecithin Co. v. McNutt, 155 F. 2d 784 (2d Cir. 1946),
cert. denied 329 U. S. 762 (1946).
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held in 1948 that a
coal mining company leasing coal lands from the federal government had no
standing to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior from leasing lands to a com-
petitor. Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co. v. Krug, 83 App. D. C. 162, 168 F. 2d
557 (1948). Early in 1949 the court reconsidered the case and held that the
company had standing because its lease from the government in legal con-
templation (though not in specific terms) embodied a regulation issued by the
Secretary and published in the Federal Register to the effect that the Secre-
tary would lease more land "only in cases where there has been furnished a
satisfactory showing that an additional coal mine is needed and that there
is an actual need for coal which cannot otherwise be reasonably met."
Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co. v. Krug, 84 App. D. C. 172, 172 F. 2d 282(1949). The Supreme Court reversed on the merits, without making a clear
decision on the issue of standing. Chapman v. Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co.,
338 U. S. 621 (1950). The statute requiring the government as a purchaser
to follow a system of competitive bidding in some circumstances is designed
for the government's benefit and not for the protection of sellers and there-
fore is held to confer no rights on bidders, who accordingly have no standing
to challenge violations of the statute. Walter P. Villere Co. v. Blinn, 156
F. 2d 914 (5th Cir. 1946) ; Fulton Iron Co. v. Larson, 84 App. D. C. 39,
171 F. 2d 994 (1948), certiorari denied 336 U. S. 903 (1949).
Taxpayers and citizens of communities near Muscle Shoals have no
standing to maintain a declaratory judgment proceeding to compel the TVA
to follow a statutory provision that "The Corporation shall maintain its
principal office in the immediate vicinity of Muscle Shoals, Alabama." Frahn
v. TVA, 41 F. Supp. 83 (N.D. Ala. 1941).
184. Reade v. Ewing, 205 F. 2d 630 (2d Cir. 1953).
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Standing to challenge orders of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission is affected by the fundamentals of the Interstate Commerce
Act, including especially the idea that Conigress has moved away
from the basic principle of enforced competition. If a competitor
has standing in a field in which that basic principle still governs,
such as radio broadcasting, then a competitor affected by regula-
tion of the ICC has an even stronger case for standing. The specific
provision coming most into play is section 1 (20) of the Interstate
Commerce Act, providing that any unlawful construction, opera-
tion, or abandonment may be enjoined "at the suit of the United
States, the commission, any commission or regulating body of the
State or States affected, or any party in interest." The Supreme
Court applies this provision in. cases challenging the Commission's
grant of certificates.8 5 Other features of the statutes have only
oblique bearing on issues of standing.8 6
In none of the Supreme Court decisions 8 7 denying standing
185. Claiborne-Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States, 285 U. S. 382(1932).
186. In some measure, congressional policies may be gleaned from pro-
visions not dealing with standing to obtain review. For instance, § 13 (1) of
the Interstate Commerce Act provides that "any person" may petition the
Commission and that unless the carrier satisfies the complaint "it shall be the
duty of the Commission to investigate the matters complained of in such
manner and by such means as it shall deem proper." 41 Stat. 484 (1920), 49
U. S. C. § 13(1) (1946). This mandatory jurisdiction shows a basic policy
favoring consideration of any and all interests asserted, and such a policy
may bear at least indirectly on problems of standing to obtain review. Never-
theless, the Supreme Court's opinions do not seem to reason in this manner.
The Motor Carrier Act differs in providing that "the Commission may
investigate," and that "Whenever the Commission is of opinion that any
complaint does not state reasonable grounds for investigation and action on
its part, it may dismiss such compaint" 49 Stat. 546 (1935), 49 U. S. C. A.§ 304(c).
187. L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pac. R. R., 311 U. S. 295 (1940);
Moffatt Tunnel League v. United States, 289 U. S. 113 (1933) ; Pittsburgh &
W. Va. Ry. v. United States, 281 U. S. 479 (1930) ; Edward Hines Trustees
v. United States, 263 U. S. 143 (1923) ; cf. Home Furniture v. United States,
271 U. S. 456 (1926).
The ICC cases, except the Singer case, are summarized in Fort, Who
May Maintain Suits to Set Aside Orders of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, 12 I. C. C. P. J. 792 (1945). See also Goldman, Standing to Chal-
lenge Orders of the I. C. C., 9 Geo. "Wash. L. Rev. 648 (1941).
Under a similar provision of the Civil Aeronautics Act, carriers cus-
tomarily have standing to object to illegal competition. Eastern Airlines v.
CAB, 185 F. 2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1950), dismissed as moot 341 U. S. 901 (1951) ;
Alaska Air Transport v. Alaska Airplane Charter Co., 72 F. Supp. 609 (D.
Alaska 1947) ; Hawaiian Airlines, Ltd. v. Trans-Pacific Airlines, Ltd 73
F. Supp. 68 (D. Hawaii 1947), reversed on other grounds, 174 F. 2d 63 (9th
Cir. 1949). This is true even where a carrier operates without a certificate of
convenience and necessity, but with letters of registration. Flying Tiger Line
v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 75 F. Supp. 188 (S.D. Calif. 1947). But one who
was lawfully operating as an irregular air carrier was held to have "no legal
right" because it operated "under a revocable license in which it has no prop-
erty interest," and therefore was without standing to object to unlawful
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under the Interstate Commerce Act was the petitioner a carrier.
Even a mere competitive interest of a carrier is sufficient for en-
forcing the Act or for challenging action of the Commission. In the
Chicago Junction Case,"8 the Commission had approved acquisition
by the New York Central of control of certain terminal railroads,
and carriers which had previously competed on equal terms with
the Central for traffic originating on the terminal railroads sought to
challenge the order. The Supreme Court held (6-3) that the plain-
tiffs had the necessary "legal interest," pointing out that much
traffic had been diverted from plaintiffs' lines to those of the New
York Central; that the annual loss in net earnings would be about
ten million dollars; and that if "a legal interest exists where car-
riers' revenues may be affected, there is clearly such an interest
here.'"1 Even though the philosophy that an adverse financial
effect upon a competitive interest is enough to confer standing
seems to be the precise antithesis of that of such cases as Alabama
Power and Tennessee Electric Power, the holding may be fitted
into the law declared in those cases by saying either that the Act
gave the railroad competitors a substantive right to be free from
illegal competition or that the Act made a mere business interest
of a carrier sufficient for standing, and that no comparable statutory
provision conferred standing upon the power companies. 190 Prob-
ably the best explanation for such a position was made by Mr.
Justice Brandeis in Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Gulf, C. & S. P. Ry.,3 91
an opinion not discussing the question of standing. Referring to
the Transportation Act of 1920, he said: "It is recognized that
preservation of the earning capacity, and conservation of the finan-
cial resources, of individual carriers is a matter of national concern;
that the property employed must be permitted to earn a reasonable
return; that the building of unnecessary lines involves a waste of re-
sources and that the burden of this waste may fall on the public;
competition. Trans-Pacific Airlines, Ltd. v. Inter-Island Steam Nav. Co.,
75 F. Supp. 690 (D. Hawaii 1948). This case seems inconsistent with the
other airline cases and with the Supreme Court's ICC cases. The court may
have been getting beyond the realm intended for judicial judgment in assert-
ing: "I fail to see where an economic battle between a lawful irregular air
carrier and an alleged unlawful irregular air carrier if allowed to continue
would materially change the air transportation situation in Hawaii." 75 F.
Supp. at 694.
188. 264 U. S. 258 (1924).
189. 264 U. S. at page 267.
190. The Court said that the Transportation Act of 1920 "prohibited any
acquisition of a railroad by a carrier, unless authorized by the Commission.
By reason of this legislation, the plaintiffs, being competitors of the New
York Central and users of the terminal railroads theretofore neutral, have a
special interest in the proposal to transfer the control to that company." Ibid.
191. 270 U. S. 266 (1926).
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that competition between carriers may result in harm to the public
as well as in benefit; and that when a railroad inflicts injury upon
its rival, it may be the public which ultimately bears the loss."' " 2
This basic policy should be a sufficient answer to the three dis-
senting justices in the Chicago Junction Case, who argued with
considerable force that nothing in the Act conferred upon the com-
plainants a right of action, that the Act had merely given the Com-
mission power to determine whether such an acquisition would be
in the public interest, that under the Act "it is the public, not
private, interest which is to be considered,"'9 3 and that the com-
plainants had no standing to vindicate the rights of the public.
Once this Brandeis analysis is accepted, other decisions recog-
nizing the standing of carriers follow easily. Thus, Western Pac.
C. R. Co. v. Southern Pac. Co.194 held that the Southern Pacific
as a competitor had standing to enjoin the Western Pacific from
constructing an extension before the ICC had granted approval.
The Court said: "It will suffice, we think, if the bill discloses that
some definite legal right possessed by complainant is seriously
threatened or that the unauthorized and therefore unlawful action
of the defendant carrier may directly and adversely affect the com-
plainant's welfare by bringing about some material change in the
transportation situation."'' 9 This is the equivalent of a statement
that the complainant need not possess "a definite legal right" and
therefore contradicts the Court's language in the Tennessee Elec-
tric Power case. Yet the contradiction is one of language, not of
substance, for nothing should hinge on the question whether the
statute is regarded as conferring a legal right or is regarded as con-
ferring standing upon one whc. has no legal right but has a financial
interest.
In Claiborne-Annapolis Ferry Co. v. United States,9" the view
of the Western Pacific case was extended to permit a ferry com-
pany to challenge the Commission's approval of a railroad's appli-
cation to operate another ferry nearby; the Court reasoned that if
a competitor could challenge operation without a certificate a com-
192. 270 U. S. at page 277.
193. 264 U. S. 258, 271 (1924). As if in anticipation of the Sanders
doctrine, which came sixteen years later, Mr. Justice Sutherland argued:
"The complainants have no standing to vindicate the rights of the public,
but only to protect and enforce their own rights." 264 U. S. at page 271-72.
194. 284 U. S.47 (1931).
195. 284 U. S. at pages,51-52'. Mr. Justice Stone, in dissent in L. Singer
& Sons v. Union Pac. R. Co., 311 U. S. 295, 314 (1940), cited the Western
Pacific case and declared that a competing carrier may have standing if its
"welfare, although not its legal right, is adversely affected."
196. 285 U. S. 382 (1932).
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petitor could challenge operation under a certificate improperly
granted.107
When the competitive interest is that of a shipper instead of
that of a carrier, standing is much less likely to be upheld. An early
Supreme Court case denying standing was Edward Hines Tristees
v. United States, holding that shippers had no standing to chal-
lenge an ICC order relieving their competitors of certain penalty
charges.Y' 8 Much more troublesome was Alexander Sprunt & Son,
Inc. v. United States.0 9 From interior points to Gulf ports, the
export or ship-side rates on cotton were 3 or 3.5 cents higher than
the city-delivery rates. Other shippers complained that the city-
delivery rates were applied to Sprunt and other owners of ware-
houses and compresses at the wharves even though the shipments
were intended for export. The Commission, without inquiring into
reasonableness of the rates, ordered a 1-cent increase in city-delivery
rates and a 2-cent reduction in the ship-side rates. The Court
agreed that the order "worsened the economic position" of Sprunt
who was therefore entitled to intervene before the Commission, but
held that an independent suit could be maintained by a shipper
"only where a right of his own is alleged to have been violated by
the order .... The appellants [Sprunt] have no independent right
which is violated by the order. ... "200 The holding is not that a
shipper may not challenge an order increasing his own rate or
decreasing the rate of his competitors; the holding is that the
shipper could successfully challenge the order only by showing
that the rate was either unreasonable or unjustly discriminatory.
197. That the cases upholding the standing of carriers, all decided by
the old Court, are not thrown overboard by the new Court is proved by Alton
R. Co. v. United States, 315 U. S. 15 (1942), which upheld the standing of
competing railroads to challenge an order granting a certificate to a motor
carrier. Mr. Justice Douglas declared for a unanimous Court: "They clearly
have a stake as carriers in the transportation situation which the order of
the Commission affected. They are competitors of Fleming for automobile
traffic in territory served by him .... They are members of the national
transportation system which that Act was designed to coordinate.... Hence
they are parties in interest ... ." 315 U. S. at page 19.
198. 263 U. S. 143 (1923). The Court said: "Cancellation of a charge
by which plaintiffs' rivals in business have been relieved of the handicap
theretofore imposed may conceivably have subjected plaintiffs to such losses
as are incident to more effective competition. But plaintiffs have no absolute
right to require carriers to impose penalty charges." 263 U. S. at page 148.
Cases earlier than this did not seem to be concerned about the question
of standing. See, e.g., ICC v. United States ex rel. Humboldt S. Co., 224
U. S. 474 (1912) ; United States ex rel. Louisville Cement Co. v. ICC, 246
U. S. 638 (1918).
199. 281 U. S. 249 (1930).
200. 281 U. S. at page 255. In Mitchell v. United States, 313 U. S. 80
(1941), a Negro was held to have standing to challenge an order permitting
discrimination against colored citizens even though he did not show that he
intended to make another railroad i~urney.
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An especially revealing case in which the Court divided six to
three is L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pacific R. Co.,201 holding that
neither a city engaged in constructing new market facilities at a cost
of $500,000, nor the private operators of a market, had standing
to secure an injunction against unlawful construction of a rail ex-
tension to serve a rival market. The Act provided for issuance of
an injunction "at the suit of the United States, the Commission, any
commission or regulating body of the State or States affected, or
any party in interest." Five justices, in a separate concurring
opinion, reasoned: "A city . ..would naturally turn to its state
commission to assert its interest.... It is reading § 1 (20) without
illumination of the scheme and purposes of the Transportation Act
to expand the categories of public agencies explicitly named by
Congress. . . .To do so would disregard recognition of a state
utility commission as the special repository of all the interests of
a state in this particular field."20 2 I-'aving disposed of the city's
claim, the five justices then announced that "a private and more
limited sufferer" necessarily lacked standing. "To entrust the vin-
dication of this public interest to a private litigant professing a
special stake in the public interest is to impinge on the responsi-
bility of the public authorities designated by Congress."203
Seldom does one encounter Supreme Court reasoning which so
readily crumbles upon close analysis. The reliance is almost entirely
upon "the scheme of enforcement that Congress has devised." A
provision conferring standing upon state commissions is trans-
formed into a provision giving state commissions exclusive power
to represent "all the interests of a state." Yet the Act confers
standing upon state commissions and adds the words "or any party
in interest." Representation of a general public interest by a state
commission is not incompatible with the direct assertion of pro-
prietary interests by a city owning affected property. To allow a
city to protect its own proprietary interest would not "expand the
categories of public agencies explicitly named by Congress" but
201. 311 U. S. 295 (1940), 13 So. Calif. L. Rev. 450 (1940).
202. 311 U. S. at pages 305-06.
203. A seemingly incidental argument was that standing in the city and
in the market "would put upon the district courts the task of drawing fine
lines in determining when a private claim is so special that it may be set
apart from the general public interest and give the claimant power to litigate
a public controversy." 311 U. S. at page 307. But whether the view of the
majority or that of the minority of the Court prevails, such a line must be
drawn somewhere. The question is whether the line should be between the
competing market and the competing carrier, or whether it should be between
the competing market and one who has no interest other than common con-
cern for obedience to law.
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would merely avoid reading out of the statute the words "or any
party in interest." The statement that standing of a private litigant
would "impinge on the responsibility of the public authorities" is
unsupported, does not carry conviction, and contradicts the con-
curring justices' express recognition that a competing carrier ad-
versely affected has standing. The opinion suggests no reason for
the view that a suit by a competing market would any more "im-
pinge on the responsibility of the public authorities" than a suit by
a competing carrier.
Mr. Justice Stone for the three dissenters pointed out that the
phrase "parties in interest" is not meaningless; that petitioners
had an interest other than common concern for obedience to law;
that the statute plainly indicates that parties in interest may be
others than the public bodies named; and that the statute gives no
warrant for saying that a railroad competitor may bring suit to
enjoin an unauthorized extension but that the market competitor
"can only ask some public body to bring it."
The minority view is exceedingly well supported, although a
line could reasonably be drawn between a competing carrier and
a competing market, on the ground that harm to a carrier may
mean harm to the public, 20 4 but that harm to an unregulated market
does not to the same extent mean harm to the public. Even so, the
minority position may still be the preferable interpretation of con-
gressional intent. Congress clearly expressed its choice to permit
not only public authorities but also "any party in interest" to sue to
enjoin an unauthorized extension. The paramount purpose was
probably the simple one of wanting to assure enforcement; one way
to get the job done, despite possible inadequacy of public authori-
ties, was to allow "any party in interest" to institute a suit for an
injunction. If the purpose was to assure enforcement, and if, as
Mr. Justice Stone pointed out, "it stands conceded that the pro-
posed extension . . . is unauthorized and unlawful," then the con-
clusion is easy that anyone with an economic interest should have
standing to institute a proceeding to enforce the Act.
State courts usually uphold the standing of competitors to chal-
lenge administrative action that adversely affects their competitive
interests. A Missouri case is representative.2 0 5 The public service
commission authorized sale of electrical properties to a cooperative,
and public utility competitors challenged the action. The statute
204. See Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry., 270 U. S. 266,
277 (1926).
205. State ex rel. Consumers Public Service Co. v. Public Service
Commission, 352 Mo. 905, 180 S. W. 2d 40 (1944).
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provided for review of an order at the instance of "any corporation
or person or public utility interested therein." In upholding the
standing of the competitors the court said that "pecuniary interest"
was unnecessary, and that "any local partisan interest ... such as
a customer, representative of -the public in the locality . or as a
competitor ... is surely sufficient."
In other states, competitors are commonly allowed to challenge
grants of operating certificates. 20 6 Even when a statute limited
review to "any party to a cause before the Commission," the Michi-
gan court has held that a competitor who was not given notice of
the administrative proceeding and therefore was not a party has
standing to challenge the grant of a permit.20 7 A seller of liquor is
held to have standing to challenge grant of a license which will
result in increased competition:208 But competitors of a small loan
company were denied standing when they were not objecting to
grant of a license but to attachment to the grant of a condition that
did not directly affect them.2 0 And a milk dealer who was not per-
mitted to become a party to the administrative proceeding leading
to grant of a license to a competitor was denied standing because
the statute allowed review only upon petition of "an aggrieved
party.) 210
§ 12. CoNsumERs, RATEPAYERS, TENANTS
When prices, rates, or rents are administratively fixed, or other
similar regulatory action is taken, do the purchasers, ratepayers,
shippers, passengers, or tenants have standing to challenge an
order?
The Supreme Court somewhat surprisingly gave a negative
answer to this question in Atlanta v. Ickes, 211 in which a city that
206. Kirkby v. Michigan Public Service Commission, 320 Mich. 608, 32
N. W. 2d 1 (1948) (upholding standing of organization of motor carriers,
statute providing for challenge by "any interested party") ; Kosciudko County
Rural E. M. Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 225 Ind. 666, 77 N. E. 2d
572 (1948) (competitor allowed to challenge under statute "any person feel-
ing aggrieved") ; Corporation Commission v. Southern Pac. Co., 67 Ariz. 87,
191 P. 2d 719 (1948) (railroad may challenge grant of certificate to motor
carrier under "any party in interest" statute).
207. Koss v. Michigan Public Service Commission, 333 Mich. 395, 53
N. W. 2d 491 (1952).
208. Saltzman v. O'Connell, 282 App. Div. 732, 122 N. Y. S. 2d 409
(1953) ; France v. O'Connell, 124 N. Y. S. 2d 771, affirmed 126 N. Y. S. 2d
207 (1954).
209. Personal Finance Co. v. Lyon, 203 Misc. 710, 121 N. Y. S. 2d
72 (1953).
210. Application of Dairymen's League Co-operative Ass'n, 282 App.
Div. 69, 121 N. Y. S. 2d 857 (1953), appeal dismissed 306 N. Y. 595, 115
N. E. 2d 825.
211. 308 U.S. 517 (1939).
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consumed a substantial amount of coal was denied an injunction and
a declaratory judgment against an order fixing minimum prices
for coal. The lower court had decided against the city on the merits.
The Supreme Court's per curiam opinion, except for citations,
was all in one sentence: "The judgment is affirmed on the ground
that the appellant has no standing to maintain this suit." The
holding is reasonably clear that a consumer which is required by a
minimum price order to pay an increased price for the coal it pur-
chases has no standing to challenge the legality of the order, and
one justice has more recently cited the case for the proposition
that "This Court has held that a consumer has no standing to
challenge a minimum price order like the one before us. 2 12 Not
one of the four cases the Court cited in the Atlanta case supports
the result.
2 1 3
For three reasons, the Atlanta case probably is not now law.
The Administrative Procedure Act would now apply; under sec-
tion 10(a) any person "adversely affected" is entitled to review.
The argument that the purchaser who has to pay a higher price by
virtue of the order is not adversely affected is hardly tenable. The
second reason is that the Atlanta case is not supported by its cita-
tions and that the thorough consideration of the problem came in
the Associated Industries case,2 1 4 which held the opposite on the
basis of the Sanders25 and other FCC cases decided since the
Atlanta case.
A third reason for believing that the Atlanta case is no longer
law is the Supreme Court's holding in the 1953 case of Chapman
212. Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Stark v. Wickard, 321 U. S. 288, 319(1944).
213. Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U. S. 118, 142 (1939),
and Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U. S. 464, 479-480 (1938), held that
competitors may not challenge the validity of the TVA or the validity of
federal loans and grants to municipal corporations. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Haworth, 300 U. S. 227, 240-241 (1937), held the federal declaratory judg-
ments act constitutional. Alexander Sprunt & Son v. United States, 281 U. S.
249, 255-256 (1930), said that the complaining shipper had no standing but
still passed upon the merits to the extent that the Court held that the shipper
"had no independent right which is violated." The dictum pages in the cita-
tions in this note are those cited by the Court; in each instance the language
falls short of supporting the conclusion that a consumer has no standing to
challenge a minimum price order.
214. Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F. 2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943), dis-
missed as moot 320 U. S. 707 (1943), discussed fully above at pages 367-369.
This decision may well be an instance of the rare phenomenon of a lower
court's decision superseding a recent Supreme Court decision. This may be
true even in spite of the language of the lower court in distinguishing the
Atlanta case.
215. FCC v. Sanders Brothers, 309 U. S. 470 (1940), discussed fully
above at pages 363-365.
1955]
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v. Federal Power Consmissk,1, 216 upholding the standing of a
cooperative representing consumers even though the interest of
the consumers was much less direct than that of the city in the
Atlanta case. The challenged order granted a license to the Virginia
Electric and Power Company to construct a dam. The cooperative
and the Secretary of the Interior asserted that Congress had pro-
vided that the dam could be developed only by public authority
under the Secretary, not by a licensed private company. The co-
operative, which was engaged in supplying electricity to its mem-
bers, had an interest in the question only to the extent that a statute
gave it a preference in the sale of power developed through public
authority. The court of appeals denied the standing of both the
Secretary and the cooperative .2 T The Supreme Court upheld the
standing of both, but because of "differences of view" wrote no
opinion on the issue of standing.21
A tenant's standing to get review of a certificate authorizing an
eviction was upheld by the Supreme Court in Parker v. Fleming21 9
even though the literal language of the statute required a denial
of standing. The statute provided that "any person who is aggrieved
by the denial ... of his protest" may get review, but also provided
that only a person "subject to amy provision of such ... order" may
make a protest. The Administrator dismissed the protest for lack
of standing, and the Emergency Court of Appeals affirmed, and
the Supreme Court reversed six to three. The Court acknowledged
that OPA Procedural Regulation No. 1 had deemed a person "sub-
ject to" a regulation or order only when the regulation or order
"prohibits or requires action by him," and the Emergency Court of
Appeals had upheld that inte:-pretation. But later the Emergency
Court had held that meat packers were "subject to" an order deny-
ing a subsidy and accordingly could protest. The Court remarked
that "If these tenants cannot 'protest' this order issued under these
regulations, no one can...." The Court significantly rejected the
narrow analytical materials showing congressional intent, in favor
of the apparent policy consideration that one so immediately affected
as a tenant by an eviction should have standing to challenge the
216. 345 U. S. 153 (1953).
217. United States ex rel. Chapman v. Federal Power Commission, 191
F. 2d 796 (4th Cir. 1951).
218. 345 U. S. at page 156.
Both the Secretary and the cooperative had been allowed to intervene
before the Commission. The statute provided review upon the petition of
"any party ... aggrieved..."
219. 329U.S. 531 (1947).
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order. The Emergency Court later held that a tenant may contest
an order retroactively raising a rent ceiling. 20
In Henderson v. United States,221 the Court held that a colored
passenger who had been subjected to segregation by a railroad and
who was free to travel again on the railroad had standing to chal-
lenge an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
After a court of appeals had specifically held that patrons of a
street car and bus company had standing to challenge an order per-
mitting broadcast of music and commercials in the vehicles, where
the statute provided for review on petition of "any person . . .
affected," the Supreme Court passed upon the merits without even
mentioning the standing issue.22 2 The standing of users of parcel
post service to challenge increased rates has been upheld by a
lower court. 2
2 3
Case law on standing of consumers to challenge orders fixing
public utility rates is scanty. The government, as a consumer of
electricity, has been held224 to have standing to challenge a District
of Columbia rate order, under a statute permitting challenge by
"any public utility, or any other person or corporation affected by
any final order. . . ." The court's simple explanation seems wholly
adequate-that giving words their ordinary meaning, a consumer
is a person affected. The cases denying standing of consumers to
challenge maximum rate orders generally rest upon special con-
siderations. 22
5
Two recent cases denying standing of patrons rest upon the
Singer case.2201 A user of and tollpayer of a toll bridge was denied
220. Pitts v. Woods, 169 F. 2d 662 (Em. App. 1948).
221. 339 U. S. 816 (1950), relying upon Mitchell v. United States, 313
U. S. 80 (1941).
222. Pollak v. Public Utilities Commission, 191 F. 2d 450 (D.C. Cir.
1951), reversed on merits, Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U. S.
451 (1952).
223. Doehla Greeting Cards, Inc. v. Summerfield, 116 F. Supp. 68
(D.C. 1953).
224. United States v. Public Utilities Commission, 80 App. D. C. 227,
151 F. 2d (1945).
225. Wright v. Central Ky. Natural Gas Co., 297 U. S. 537 (1936)
(consumers held to have no standing to complain when city and company
compromised); City of New York v. New York Tel. Co., 261 U. S. 312
(1923) (city as a subscriber to telephone service denied intervention injudicial proceeding in which company challenged order of Public Service
Commission) ; Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 270 U. S. 587 (1926) (sub-
scribers bound by decree because commission "represents the public and
especially the subscribers") ; cf. Alston Coal Co. v. FPC, 137 F. 2d 740 (10th
Cir. 1943) (coal company denied intervention in FPC proceeding investigating
gas rates).
226. L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pacific R. Co., 311 U. S. 295 (1940),
discussed above at pages 404-405.
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standing to compel disclosure of records of the toll bridge even
though the statute provided that records "shall be available for the
information of all persons interested." 2 7 The holding that the
plaintiff was not a person interested is an extreme one. A dentist
who used a ferry from Newport News to Norfolk was held to have
no standing to challenge an order permitting abandonment of the
service.228
Reade v. Ewing 9 may be a fair sample of the direction in
which the law of standing is growing. A dealer in fish oils used for
a natural source of vitamin A. sought review of an order of the
Federal Security Administrator allowing the vitamin content of
oleomargarine to be supplied by synthetic as well as natural sources.
without disclosure on the label. Whether a dealer as such had
standing under the precedents was doubtful. The court pointed
out that the petitioner and members of his family were consumers
of oleomargarine and held that in their capacity as consumers they
had standing to challenge the order. The statute provided that "any
person who will be adversely affected by such order may file a
petition." The court reasoned that Congress could have authorized
the Attorney General to sue, that such a suit would satisfy the case
or controversy requirement, and that Congress here has created a
class of private Attorney Generals to vindicate the right of the
United States against its wrongdoing officer. The reasoning is im-
portant, for it can be used whenever the "adversely affected" pro-
vision of the Administrative Procedure Act is applicable.
A good sample of state cases on standing of a consumer is an
Indiana decision that one who used gas for cooking and heating
a residence has standing to challenge a public service commission
order approving sale of assets by one public utility company to
another, under a statute that one who is "adversely affected" may
obtain review.2 30 The court recited a rule to which state courts
often pay lip service that "merely a general interest common to all
members of the public" is not enough, but held that "consumers of
the products of such utilities have the undoubted right to assert
that they are adversely affected."' 23' If, as in New Jersey, "a resi-
227. Borah v. White County Bridge Commission, 190 F. 2d 213 (7th
Cir. 1952).
228. Johnson v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 188 F. 2d 458 (4th Cir. 1951).
229. 205 F. 2d 630 (2d Cir. 1953).
230. Terre Haute Gas Corp. v. Johnson, 221 Ind. 499, 45 N. E. 2d 484
(1942).
231. In M. W. Smith Lumber Co. v. Alabama Public Service Commis-
sion, 247 Ala. 318, 24 So. 2d 409 (1946) a commercial consumer sought to
challenge an order refunding one month's bill to residential consumers; the
court held that the plaintiff had failed to show that any substantial right
would be affected by the order.
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dent, citizen, and owner of real estate" may challenge an increase
in the fare of a street railway, on the ground that "the matter
probably concerns every resident of the city," 232 then upholding
the standing of passengers who pay the fare ought to be easy.
§ 13. EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES
In National Coal Ass'n v. Federal Power Commission,2 33 parties
held to have standing to challenge grant of a certificate to construct
a natural gas pipeline included not only an association of coal pro-
ducers but also the United Mine Workers, representing employees
of coal producers, and the Railway Labor Executives Association,
representing employees of competing railroads.
One of the most extreme decisions in the entire law of stand-
ing is Gaizge Lumber Co. v. Rowley. 34 After a statutory period of
limitation had expired, a state agency made an award of workmen's
compensation, relying upon a retroactive statutory extension of
the period. The employer challenged the award, contending denial
of due process. The state supreme court held against the employer
on the merits. The federal Supreme Court -held that the employer
"has not made the showing of substantial harm, actual or impend-
ing, to any legally protected interest which is necessary to call in
question the statute's validity." 35 Under the workmen's compensa-
tion system of the State of Washington, the employer pays pre-
miums into a fund of the state treasury, from which injured em-
ployees are compensated. The premium rates are determined by a
complex system resting in part upon a two-year cost experience of
each class of employers and in part upon a five-year cost experience
of each employer. The questionable feature of the Gange decision
lies in the Court's failure to heed the provision of the state statute:
232. O'Brien v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 92 N. J. L. 44,
105 A. 132 (Sup. Ct. 1918), affirmed on other grounds, 92 N. J. L. 587, 106
A. 414 (1919). See Witmer, Consumers' Appeals from Public Service Com-
mission Rate Orders, 8 U. of Chli. L. Rev. 258 (1941).
233. 191 F. 2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
But compare Parker v. Bowron, 40 Cal. 2d 344, 254 P. 2d 6 (1953),
denying standing of unions in a mandate proceeding to compel city officials to
fix certain wages for the city's employees.
In Pennsylvania Commercial Drivers Conference v. Pennsylvania Milk
Control Commission, 360 Pa. 477, 62 A. 2d 9 (1948), the court's language
',eems to indicate that unions representing employees of dairy companies have
no standing to challenge an order of the Commission limiting deliveries of
milk to every other day. But a close examination of the case shows that the
unions were not objecting to the every-other-day delivery but rather to
administrative action on a subject that "is normally handled through the
pro i,-e,,s of collective bargaining."
234. 326 U. S. 295 (1945).
23,5 326 U. S. at pages 307-308.
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"Any claimant, employer or other person aggrieved by any such
order, decision or award must, before he appeals to the courts, serve
upon the director... an application for rehearing ... Within thirty
days after the final order of the joint board upon such application
for rehearing has been communicated to such applicant . . . such
applicant may appeal to the superior court .... ,,230
Largely on the authority of the Gange case, a court of appeals
has held that an employer has no standing to challenge payments
from a federal fund for unemployment compensation to striking
employees.23 7 The court reasoned: "Their payment could not pos-
sibly affect the rate of contribution by the carriers for the current
years. 2 88
In the field of the National Labor Relations Board, problems of
standing must distinguish carefully between standing to enforce,
standing to resist enforcement, and standing to obtain review. As
we have seen,22 9 an employer who is resisting enforcement has
standing to assert that the Board's order is unlawful by reason of
failure of officers of a union to file a non-Communist affidavit.240
An employer would not necessarily have standing to obtain judicial
review on that ground.24 1
Although shippers and cariers may often represent their own
236. Wash. Rev. Stat Ann. § 7697 (1932).
Instead of setting forth this provision in its opinion, the Court merely
summarized it in a footnote. Instead of stating explicitly that the statute
gave the employer a right of review, the Court said only: "Appeal lies from
the board's order to the Superior Court. . . ." The Court, however, could
hardly have been unaware of the employer's right of review, for the employer
had obtained review in the state courts in this very case. The result therefore
seems to be the extreme one of denying the employer's standing even though
the statute conferred such standing. Such a result is unique among Supreme
Court cases.
The opinion intimates that a complainant might lack standing to raise
constitutional questions even though he has standing to raise nonconstitutional
questions. Thus, the Court said: "The Fourteenth Amendment, through the
due process clause, does not assure protection from the states' regulatory
powers against injuries so remote, contingent and speculative." This statement
seems also to demonstrate a seeming merger of the standing question with
the constitutional question; in some measure the Court in this statement
passes upon the constitutional issue.
237. Railway Express Agency v. Kennedy, 189 F. 2d 801 (7th Cir.
1951).
238. 189 F. 2d at page 805.
But compare Tube Reducing Corp. v. Unemployment Compensation
Commission, 1 N. J. 182, 62 A. 2d 473 (1948), affirming 136 N. J. L. 410, 56
A. 2d 596 (1948), holding that employer has special interest in unemploy-
ment compensation fund.
239. See pages 379-381, above.
240. NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U. S. 322 (1951).
241. In Bethlehem Steel Co. v. NLRB, 191 F. 2d 340 (D.C. Cir. 1951),
the employer petitioned for review on this ground, and the employer's stand-
ing was upheld, but the Board also sought enforcement.
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interests under the Interstate Commerce Act, and although broad-
casting stations may often represent the public interest under the
Federal Communications Act, unions and employees seeking to
enforce Labor Board action against an employer ordinarily have
standing neither as representatives of their own interests nor as
representatives of the public interest.
The leading case on standing to enforce is Amalgamated Utility
Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co.242 The Board ordered the
company to cease and desist and to take affirmative action, including
reinstatement of six employees with back pay. After a decree of
enforcement had been modified and affirmed by the Supreme Court,
the union brought a proceeding to have the company adjudged in
contempt for failure to comply. The Act provided: "The Board is
empowered ... to prevent any person from engaging in any un-
fair labor practice ... This power shall be exclusive .... 243 The
Court, specifically rejecting the union's tontention that the Act
"creates private rights,"244 held that the Board alone is authorized
to take proceedings to enforce its order. 45 The Court quoted from
the legislative history, including a statement of the House Com-
mittee that "No private right of action is contemplated." The
Court observed that the legislative history showed a deliberate de-
sign that the Act should be unlike the Interstate Commerce Act,
which imposes duties upon carriers and confers corresponding
rights upon individuals, but was intended to be like the Federal
Trade Commission Act, which, as the Supreme Court held in the
Klesner case, "does not provide private persons with an administra-
tive remedy for private wrongs.
' 24 6
The Amalgamated case, decided by a unanimous Court, fur-
nishes the cornerstone for much case law, and seems deeply em-
bedded; yet the Court's reasoning proves the congressional intent
that the Board should be the exclusive authority to institute and
conduct administrative proceedings, but in no way proves the
intent to make the Board the exclusive authority to enforce an
order of tfhe Board. Furthermore, practical reasons for centralized
242. 309 U. S. 261 (1940).
243. 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 160(a).
244. The union argued that the Act confers standing upon private per-
sons by the provision permitting "any person aggrie -ed by a final order of
the Board granting or denying in whole or in part, the relief sought to obtain
review." See 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 160(f). The Court rejected
the argument by saying that "it is an opportunity afforded to contest a final
order of the Board, not to enforce it." (Court's italics.)
245. Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison, 309 U. S.
261, 265 (1940).
246. FTC v. Klesner, 280 U. S. 19, 25 (192 ).
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planning relate almost entirely to instituting administrative pro-
ceedings and hardly at all to instituting contempt proceedings. If
the Board's funds and staff are inadequate for providing prompt
enforcement of judicial decrees, what can be lost by permitting those
whose interests are most immediately affected-the union and the
employees-to assure that a judicial decree is diligently policed and
enforced ?247 Such an interpretation, which would not be inconsistent
with the underlying theory that the Act is primarily concerned with
"public rights" rather than with "private rights,"248s is now helped
by the LMRA's elimination of one of the principal props of the
Anmlgamated case-the clause making the Board's power to pre-
vent unfair labor practices "exclusive." 249
Comparison with FCC cases reveals extreme incongruity: the
Communications Act explicitly provides that no license creates
"any right, beyond the terms, conditions, and periods of the
license, ' 250 and the Labor Act provides that "employees shall have
the right to self-organization" ;'25 yet the rival broadcasting station
is permitted to assert the public interest in opposing the position of
the public agency, while the union or employee is denied standing
to assert its own interest or the public interest in enforcing the
position of the public agency. The broadcasting station has a remedy
without a right; the union has a right without a remedy (unless
the Board chooses to enforce it) ; in neither case can any substan-
tial reason be given for rejecting the simple idea that the private
247. A union has standing to enjoin an employer's violation of the Rail-
way Labor Act. Virginia Ry. v. System Federation, 300 U. S. 515 (1937).
But that Act provides no administrative enforcement machinery, and the
choice was between judicial enforcement and no enforcement.
In Stewart Die Casting Corp. v. NLRB, 132 F. 2d 801 (7th Cir. 1942),
both the advantages and disadvantages of exclusive enforcement power in
the Board are brought into bolder relief. After the court had entered an
enforcing decree, and after the Board had applied to the court for a con-
tempt order, the Board and the company composed their differences as to
amounts due discharged employees and the company paid the Board $300,000
to cover its entire back pay liability to employees. The court applied the rule
of the Analgamated case and held that the aggrieved employees had no right
to intervene or to be heard on their contention that they were deprived of
back wages due them.
248. For a thorough discussion of that underlying theory, see Jaffe,
The Public Right Dogma in Labor Board Cases, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 720 (1946).
249. A Court of Appeals, in holding that a union may not under the new
Act maintain a suit against an employer to enjoin an unfair labor practice,
quotes from a conference committee report to show that the Act eliminated
the clause "because of its provisions authorizing temporary injunctions en-
joining alleged unfair labor practices and because of its provisions making
unions suable." Amazon Cotton Mill Co. v. Textile Workers Union, 167
F. 2d 183 (4th Cir. 1948).
250. 48 Stat. 1081 (1934), 47 U. S. C. A. § 301.
251. 49 Stat 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 157. The Act in its first sec-
tion refers to "the right of employees to organize." 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29
U. S. C. A. § 151.
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party should be allowed to represent his own interest, the determi-
nation depending in the customary fashion upon whatever public
interest should be taken into account.252
Whether a union or an employee may challenge an order of
the Board in a case involving an unfair labor practice of an em-
ployer is not dear; apparently the question has been of little prac-
tical consequence. The Act provides: "Any person aggrieved by a
final order of the Board granting or denying in whole or in part
the relief sought may obtain a review of such order... ."253 It is
hard to see how anyone could be aggrieved by a denial of relief
against an employer if a union or an employee is not so aggrieved;
unless the words "or denying" are to be without effect, the union
or the employee must have standing to challenge a Board order. Yet
decisions of lower courts are in conflict.2 5 4
The Supreme Court has held that the Act does not provide for
review of a certification order at the instance of an aggrieved
union.2 5 1 In so holding, the Court left open the question whether a
union could maintain an independent suit in a district court to set
aside the Board's action. That question arose in the bizarre case
of Inland Empire District CoZOucil V. Mihli. 2 8 A union sought to
enjoin enforcement of a certification order on the ground that the
Board had denied the union due process of law by holding a hearing
after rather than before an election among employees. The Court
said that the question whether a union could challenge a certification
in an injunction proceeding, "should not be decided in the absence
of some showing that the Board has acted unlawfully." The Court
then discussed the lawfulness of the Board's action and upheld it.
252. Yet the Court on occasion seems to find expedient the recognition
of private rights on the part of unions or employees. Thus, in NLRB v.
Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S. 240, 258 (1939), the Court said:
"... the purpose of the Act is to promote peaceful settlements of disputes by
providing legal remedies for the invasion of the employees' rights." See Hart
and Prichard, The Fansteel Case, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 1275 (1939).
253. 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. A. § 160(f).
254. Jacobsen v. NLRB, 120 F. 2d 96 (3d Cir. 1941) (held, without
mentioning the key words "or denying," that employees could challenge the
Board's dismissal of a complaint) ; Anthony v. NLRB, 132 F. 2d 620 (6th
Cir. 1942) ("A workman has no personal claim for back pay or reinstate-
ment in employment enforcible in this court. Hence he is not a 'person ag-
grieved' within the meaning of that Act."); Hamilton v. NLRB, 160 F. 2d
465 (6th Cir. 1947, certiorari denied 332 U. S. 762) (employee denied reinstate-
ment by Board denied relief by reviewing court, on ground that finding was
supported by substantial evidence, no mention being made of employee's
standing to obtain review.)
255. AFL v. NLRB, 308 U. S. 401 (1940). For an extreme application
of this doctrine, see NLRB v. NBC, 150 F. 2d 895 (2d Cir. 1945), criticized
adversely by Jaffe, The Public Rqht Dogma in Labor Board Cases, 59 Harv.
L. Rev. 720, 731-32 (1946).
256. 325 U. S. 697 (1945)
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Therefore, according to the theory of the opinion, the question
whether the union could raise the question of lawfulness was not
passed upon. Yet the Court did pass upon the lawfulness question-
the merits of the case. On the basis of what the Court did as dis-
tinguished from what it said, -,he conclusion seems to be that when
a union objects to a certification on constitutional grounds, the
union may get immediate review of the constitutional issue through
an injunction proceeding. Whether or not this result is limited to
constitutional issues is the subject of conflicting decisions in the
lower federal courts.
257
§ 14. REGULATED PARTIEs
Although the standing of regulated parties to challenge regula-
tory action is normally assumed, a few problems of the standing of
such parties have been troublesome.
The FCC's chain broadcasting regulations were designed to
regulate the networks, even though the regulations took the form
of providing that a license of a station which had entered into a
network contract containing designated types of restrictive provi-
sions would not be renewed. A divided Supreme Court upheld the
standing of the network to cheilenge the regulations before they had
been applied in a license proceeding.
258
Stark v. Wickard259 combines a problem of unreviewability
with a problem of standing of a regulated party. A minimum-price
order required the handler to divide his payment to the producer
into two parts, one to be paid directly to the producer, and the
other to be paid into a fund out of which deductions were made
before the amounts were paid to producers. The validity of such
a deduction had previously been challenged by handlers, and the
Supreme Court had held that they had no standing: "If the de-
ductions from the fund are small or nothing, the patron [producer]
receives a higher uniform price but the handler is not affected." '-" In
257. Denying review: New Bedford Loomfixers' Union v. Alpert, 110
F. Supp. 723 (D. Mass. 1953) ; International Union v. International Union,
173 F. 2d 557, 559 (8th Cir. 1949) ; Fitzgerald v. Douds, 167 F. 2d 714 (2d
Cir. 1948). Granting review: Fay v. Douds, 172 F. 2d 720, 723 (2d Cir.
1949) ; Klein v. Herrick, 41 F. Supp. 417 (S.D. N.Y. 1941).
258. Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U. S. 407.
(1942), discussed fully in Davis, Administrative Law 648-652 (1951). The
significance of the holding on the standing question, as distinguished from
the ripeness question, is lessened by the ownership by CBS of seven stations.
Compare FCC v. American Broadcasting Co., 347 U. S. 284 (1954).
259. 321 U. S. 288 (1944).




the Stark case, a divided Court upheld the producers' standing.
The deduction reduced the amount they received for their milk and
the Court found the requisite "interference with some legal right
of theirs" in the statute: "The statute endows the producer with
... the right to be paid a minimum price." The surprise is that
two justices dissented. The key to the Frankfurter dissent was the
view that "To create a judicial remedy for producers when the
statute gave none is to dislocate the Congressional scheme of en-
forcement."2 61 The Black dissent was on the ground stated by the
court of appeals-that the producers showed no "substantive private
legally protected interest."26 2 The view of Mr. justice Black thus
was that a producer whose prices are fixed has no standing to
challenge the administrative action which determines the amount
he will receive for his milk.
In the Lukens case 21 a party whose employees' wages were sub-
jected to regulation through the Walsh-Healy Act was held without
standing on the ground that the government was acting in its pro-
prietary capacity; the holding has been legislatively reversed.264
In Safeway Stores v'. DiSalle,26 5 a retailer whose prices were
fixed was held to have no standing to object on the ground of viola-
tion of a statutory provision designed to protect producers of agri-
cultural commodities.
This leaves the troublesome case of Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee v. AlcGrath,216 involving a mixed problem of standing
and ripeness. The five justices of the majority wrote five opinions.
The Committee and two other organizations, placed on the "sub-
versive list" by the Attorney General, who provided the organiza-
tions no opportunity to be heard, were held to have standing to
challenge the action in a declaratory proceeding. The case is fully
discussed elsewhere.
-26 7
§ 15. PUBLIC AUTHORITIES
The outstanding decision on standing of a public official to chal-
lenge administrative action is probably Chapman v. Federal Power
ConmInssion,2 68 upholding standing of the Secretary of the Interior
261. 321 U. S. at page 317.
262. Stark v. Wickard, 136 F. 2d 786, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
263. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U. S. 113 (1940), more fully
discussed above at pages 362-363.
264. See page 363, supra.
265. 198 F. 2d 269 (D.C. Cir. 1952), more fuly discussed above at pages
372-374.
266. 341 U. S. 123 (1951).
267. See Davis, Administrative Law 662-663 (1951).
268. 345 U. S. 153 (1953).
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to challenge an order granting a license to construct a dam. Since
a division within the Court precluded the Supreme Court from
writing an opinion on the stamding question, we must rely upon
the opinion of the court of appeals for analysis. 26" The Secretary
and a cooperative association2 70 had been permitted to intervene
before the Commission, and 'the statute allowed review upon the
petition of "any party... aggrieved.. ." The Court observed that
"The Solicitor General gave his permission that the Secretary of
the Interior file a petition for review of the Commission's order;
but it is clear that this could not confer any right to seek review
unless the Secretary is a party aggrieved within the meaning of
the statute."12 7'
The basis for the Secretary's standing was his statutory duty
to act as sole marketing agent of surplus power developed at public
hydroelectric projects in order to "encourage the most widespread
use thereof at the lowest possible rates to consumers consistent with
sound business principles. 2 7 " The Secretary's position was that
the licensing of the private company disturbed the congressional
policy administered by the Secretary. In addition to this specific
interest of the Secretary, he had general duties relating to the
conservation and utilization of water resources. The Supreme Court
evidently thought tbese interests sufficient for the Secretary's stand-
ing, for it reversed the holding of the court of appeals that the
statute "confers no right or interest in any power project or its
development, or any responsibility with regard thereto, upon the
Secretary ... "273 The Court said that the choice between private
and public enterprise was for the Commission, not for the Secretary:
"Before a member of the cabinet may attack the Commission's
action before the courts he must be able to point to some special
interest for which he is charged with responsibility that may be
adversely affected by the action attacked."27 4 Lack of a Supreme
Court opinion on the issue of standing leaves the meaning of the
case uncertain.
When a state public utilities commission sought to challenge an
order of the Federal Power Commission granting a certificate to
one company to, sell natural gas and revoking the certificate of
another company, the court decided the merits despite a contention
269. United States ex rel. Chapman v. Federal Power Commission, 191
F. 2d 796 (4th Cir. 1951).
270. See discussion of the standing of the cooperative above at pages
407408.
271. 191 F. 2d at page 799.
272. 58 Stat. 890 (1944), 16 U. S. C. A, § 825s (1953 Supp.).
273. 191 F. 2d at page 799.
274. 191 F. 2d at page 800.
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that the petitioner lacked standing, but the court avoided a specific
holding that the petitioner had standing.275 In Phillips Petroleun
Co. v. Wisco11cin,2711 the State of Wisconsin was allowed to chal-
lenge a decision of the FPC to the effect that the FPC had no
jurisdiction to regulate the prices charged by an independent pro-
ducer of natural gas. Neither the Supreme Court nor the court of
appeals discussed the question of standing. Wisconsin was a party
to the proceeding before the Commission, and the Natural Gas Act
provides: "Any party to a proceeding . . . aggrieved by an order
issued by the Commission in such proceeding may obtain a review
of such order.. ."27,7
Scattered state cases pass upon various problems of standing of
public authorities. In West Virginia the Director of Unemployment
Compensation is held to have standing to obtain judicial review of
a denial of claims by a Board of Review, under a statute allowing
"any party aggrieved" to obtain review s. 27 But in Pennsylvania the
Department of Labor and Industry has no standing to appeal from
a decision of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review,
for the Department is not a "party... aggrieved" within the mean-
ing of the statute.2 79 The Attorney General of Missouri lacks stand-
ing to obtain review of approval by the Public Service Commission
of sale of franchises from one electric company to another.28 0 In
upholding the standing of the Attorney General to intervene in a
review of an order permitting construction of a dam, the Wisconsin
court gave a reason which some lawyers may believe to be of ques-
tionable soundness: "To hold that the Public Service Commission
should not only decide between these conflicting interests in its
judicial capacity, but also should represent the state in protecting
public rights, would make the Commission both judge and advocate
at the same time. Such a concept violates our sense of fair play and
due process which we believe administrative agencies acting in a
quasi judicial capacity should ever observe.' 281 The Commission
275. Public Utilities Commission v. Federal Power Commission, 205
F. 2d 116 (3d Cir. 1953).
276. 347 U. S. 672 (1954).
277. 52 Stat 831 (1938), 15 U. S. C. A. § 717r. The statute also pro-
vides: "Any person, State, municipality, or State commission aggrieved by
an order ... may apply for a rehearing ... No proceeding to review any
order ... shall be brought by any person unless such person shall have made
application to the Commission for a rehearing thereon."
278. State v. Hix, 132 W. Va. 516, 54 S. E. 2d 198 (1949).
279. Department of Labor and Industry v. Unemployment Compensation
Board, 362 Pa. 342, 67 A. 2d 114 (1949).
280. McKittrick v. Public Service Commission, 352 Mo. 29, 175 S. W.
2d 857 (1943).
281. Muench v. Public Service Commission, 261 Wis. 492, 514; 53 N. W.
2d 514, 523 (1952).
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can protect the public interest without assuming the role of advo-
cate; furthermore, the Commission could properly direct members
of its staff to assume the role of advocate if that were desirable. The
People's Counsel in Maryland has standing as a "person in inter-
est" to challenge a public utility rate order. -82 In a dispute about
respective powers of two Connecticut boards, the Board of Educa-
tion has standing to get a declaratory judgment against the Board
of Finance even though the court seems to say that "no justiciable
right is involved.1283
In Maryland, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, a zoning board of ad-
justment has no standing to appeal from the decision of a lower
court reversing an order of the board.284 The Ohio court reasons
that although the board represents the public interest, it may not
become a partisan.28 5 Such a board may take an appeal in Texas,
Connecticut, Minnesota and Oklahoma. 28 The reasoning of the
Connecticut court is that the board is in the best position to pro-
tect the public interest .2 7 The latter cases are in accord with the
federal system.2 8 8 If a board is represented in the revieiving court
by an officer who does not participate in the board's judicial func-
tion, the board's judicial balance is hardly upset by having its deci-
sions defended in a reviewing court. Even if members of the board
personally participate in the review proceeding, arguing in favor of
positions taken is not much different from the action of judges in
writing argumentative majority or dissenting opinions, and is not
much different from arguing before legislative committees in favor
of the policies chosen.28 9
282. Bosley v. Dorsey, 191 Md. 229, 60 A. 2d 691 (1948).
283. Board of Education v. Board of Finance, 127 Conn. 345, 16 A. 2d
601 (1940).
284. Board of Zoning Appeals v. McKinney. 174 Md. 551, 199 A. 540
(1938) ; A. Di Cillo & Sons v. Chester Zoning Board of Appeals, 158 Ohio
St. 302, 109 N. E. 2d 8 (1952) ; Department v. Unemployment Compensation
Board, 362 Pa. 342,67 A. 2d 114 (1949).
285. 158 Ohio St. at page 305, 109 N. E. 2d at page 10.
286. Board of Adjustment v. Stovall, 147 Tem. 366, 216 S. W. 2d 171
(1949); Rommell v. Walsh, 12:7 Conn. 16, 15 A. 2d 6 (1940); Moede v.
Board of County Commissioners, 43 Minn. 312, 45 N. W. 435 (1890) ; Board
of Commissioners v. Woodford School District, 165 Okla. 227, 25 P. 2d 1057
(1933).
287. 127 Conn. at page 21, 15 A. 2d at page 9.
288. Every volume of reports of federal decisions contains cases in
which federal agencies are parties, and no one ever challenges the propriety
of this practice.
289. A city, town, city council, or borough council often has standing
to represent the public interest before a reviewing court in a zoning case.
Mayor and City Council v. Shapiro, 187 Md. 623, 51 A. 2d 273 (1947);
Perelman v. Board of Adjustment, 144 Pa. Super. 5, 18 A. 2d 438 (1941):
Keating v. Patterson, 132 Conn. 210, 43 A. 2d 659 (1945).
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§ 16. PARTIES AFFECTED BY ZONING
Zoning gives rise to a few special problems of standing. One
whose application for a zoning permit is denied may of course chal-
lenge the denial.29 0 Both adjoining landowners and an owner of
lands in the immediate vicinity have standing to challenge the grant
of a variance.291 The usual test as to what landowners may chal-
lenge a variance is stated by the Rhode Island court: "Generally
speaking the owner of property, the use of which naturally would
be affected adversely by a decision granting an exception or vari-
ance, is considered to be an aggrieved person having a right to
such a review."2 92 The court in applying this test held that an
owner "within a street or two of applicant's land and.., in the same
established residential zoning district" may challenge because "the
proposed change is such that it naturally and reasonably would
affect the value and use of property in the immediate vicinity." 293
Parties who were "competitors, taxpayers, property owners and
electors" were held to have standing to object to a variance in
favor of a liquor store on the ground that they were owners of
residential property in the vicinity; the court said that their status
as competitors was not enough.294 A resident and taxpayer who
owned a home about a half mile from the property to which the
variance was granted was held to have standing, but the court
relied upon the challenger's status as a taxpayer: "The expense
of the local police ... is largely dependent on the number of the
liquor saloons .... If licenses are granted with too free a hand...
the burdens of taxation are likely to be increased .... Every tax-
payer, therefore, has a certain, though it may be small, pecuniary
interest.., and.., an additional interest, common to every citizen,
in promoting the general welfare." 295
A few cases are less liberal.296 A company having a large indus-
290. Smith v. Selligman, 270 Ky. 69, 109 S. W. 2d 14 (1937).
291. Lynch v. Borough of Hillsdale, 136 N. J. L. 129, 54 A. 2d 723
(1947).
292. Flynn v. Zoning Board, 77 R. I. 118, 122, 73 A. 2d 808, 810 (1950).
293. Ibid.
294. Farr v. Zoning Board, 139 Conn. 577, 95 A. 2d 792 (1953).
A competitor as such has no standing to object to a variance. Circle
Lounge & Grille v. Board of Appeal, 324 Mass. 427, 86 N. E. 2d 920 (1949).
295. O'Connor v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 140 Conn. 65, 98 A.
2d 515, 518 (1953).
296. A lower court in New York is much less liberal. The Board issued
a permit for a guest house or motel in a rural residential district. The peti-
tioners owned residential property a mile and a half by air line and two miles
or more by road from the site of the guest house or motel. The court held the
petitioners not "aggrieved" under the statute: "A person is entitled to pro-
ceed to attack the validity of such a decision only where he is specially and
adversely affected thereby." Blumberg v. Hill, 119 N. Y. S. 2d 855, 857
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1953).
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trial establishment directly across the street from the place to
which a liquor store was to move, and also owned a private play-
ground three hundred feet away, was held not to be a "party ag-
grieved" because the interest was "too remote."297 A user of a
ditch which would become overloaded with water because of a
drainage improvement is held not to be a "party aggrieved" by the
improvement, because the user is only "remotely or indirectly
affected." 298
Somewhat surprisingly, in Maryland an association of property
owners and taxpayers has no standing, even though its members
are "interested" or "aggrieved" within the meaning of the statute,
although the president of the association was held to have standing
as a taxpayer.29 9 Another association of property owners is denied
standing because the association is not an owner of property and
because no showing was made that any of its rights were adversely
affected. 300
A mortgagee can be an "'aggrieved person" to object to a
variance.3 01 The president and principal stockholder of a corpora-
tion which owns land asserted to be injuriously affected is held in
New Jersey to have no standing because he has no "personal prop-
erty interest which will be specially affected in an injurious man-
ner."302
Standing is often denied because pleadings fail to show the in-
terest of the complaining parties. 0 3
A Rhode Island case is unusual in that it deals with the
standing of defendants. The remonstrants had appeared before the
Board to oppose issuance of a permit, which the Board had denied.
The petitioner sought review, and the remonstrants contended in
the reviewing court that as a matter of right they could appear,
file briefs and present argument. The court said that the remon-
297. Giammaria v. American Bridge Co., 166 Pa. Super. 263, 70 A. 2d
402 (1950).
298. Schoenfelder v. Beckman, 238 Minn. 15, 55 N. W. 2d 305 (1952).
299. Windsor Hills Improvement Ass'n v. Baltimore, 195 Md. 383, 73
A. 2d 531 (1950).
300. Property Owners Ass'n v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 123 N. Y. S.
2d 716 (N.Y. Sup Ct. 1953). Contra: Hudson Bergen County Ass'n v. Board
of Commissioners, 135 N. J. L. 502, 52 A. 2d 668 (1947) (association repre-
senting liquor stores has standing ;n liquor license case).
The federal courts permit an association to represent members who would
have standing. Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F. 2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943),
dismissed as moot 320 U. S. 707 (1943).
301. Eckerman v. Murdock, 276 App. Div. 927, 94 N. Y. S. 2d 557(1950).
302. Menges v. Bernards Township, 4 N. J. 556, 73 A. 2d 540 (1950).
303. Winston v. Zoning Board, 407 Ill. 588, 95 N. E. 2d 864 (1950);
Dimitri v. Zoning Board, 61 R. I. 325, 200 A. 963 (1938).
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strants were not "aggrieved" within the meaning of the statute
because the decision was in their favor, but the court nevertheless
permitted them to file briefs and to present argument. 04
§ 17. PROBLEMS OF FEDERALISM AND STANDING
As we have seen throughout this discussion, the state courts
often uphold the standing of parties who in the same circumstances
would be denied standing in the federal courts. The troublesome
problem of federalism concerning the law of standing arises when
the Supreme Court finds that the plaintiff in a case coming up
through state courts lacks standing under the practice developed
by the federal courts. Should the Supreme Court (1) follow the
state law on the question of standing, (2) apply the same law of
standing that would be applied if the case had originated in a federal
court, or (3) take some intermecIiate view between these extremes?
Each of the three possible positions seems to have some support.305
A rather complete deference to the state on the standing ques-
tion was shown in Heim v. McCall.300 A New York statute gave
a preference in employment of persons on public works to citizens
of New York and of the United States, and contracts for public
construction permitted cancellation for violation of the requirement.
When the Public Service Commission threatened a cancellation, "a
property owner and taxpayer" sued to enjoin the commissioners,
arguing unconstitutionality. The Supreme Court devoted three
sentences to the question of standing: "There seems to have been
no question raised as to the right of Heim to maintain the suit,
although he is not one of the contractors nor a laborer of the ex-
cluded nationality or citizenship. The Appellate Division felt that
there might be objection to the right, under the holding of a cited
case. The Court of Appeals, however, made no comment, and we
must-certainly may-assume that Heim had a suit of right; and,
so assuming, we pass to the merits. ' 30 7
304. M. & L. Die & Tool Co. v. Board of Review, 76 R. I. 417, 71 A.
2d 511 (1950).
305. That some cases take the first position and some cases take the
second position may mean that the overall position is essentially the third or
intermediate position.
The language of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Coleman v. Miller, 307
U. S. 433, 465 (1939) is a theoretical recognition of the third position: "The
doctrines affecting standing to sue in the federal courts will not be treated
as mechanical yardsticks in assessing state court ascertainments of legal in-
terest brought here for review.... Thus, while the ordinary state taxpayer's
suit is not recognized in the federal courts, it affords adequate standing for
review of state decisions when so recognized by state courts."
306. 239 U. S. 175 (1915).
307. 239 U. S. at pages 186-187.
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In a 1939 case the majority of the Court discussed the Hein
case with seeming approval,308 and Mr. Justice Frankfurter cited
it in support of the proposition that "while the ordinary state tax-
payer's suit is not recognized in the federal courts, it affords ade-
quate standing for review of state decisions when so recognized by
state courts."309 The Frankfurter view is puzzling in that the tax-
payer in the Heim case was challenging discrimination, not expendi-
ture. Even though the Heim case stands alone in contrast with
much law that the Supreme Ccurt has later developed on the prob-
lem of standing, the ease and simplicity of the Heinz case may be
much more desirable than the difficulty and complexity of the
Supreme Court's present doctrine.
An extreme decision in the opposite direction is Gange Lumber
Co. v. Rowley, °10 which has already been discussed.31  The Supreme
Court refused to decide the merits on the ground of lack of stand-
ing, even though the state court had decided the merits in a suit by
the employer and even though the state statute specifically provided
that judicial review could be had by an "employer."
If all federal cases denying standing rested upon theoretical
lack of "case" or "controversy," then the theory would force the
Supreme Court to apply its own standing doctrine in all cases com-
ing up from state courts. But the Supreme Court has not clarified
the extent to which its standing doctrine has a constitutional base,
and the extent to which the doctrine rests merely upon ideas of con-
venience and orderly procedure. Probably the most significant pro-
nouncement on this question came in Barrows v. Jackson :31, "The
requirement of standing is often used to describe the constitutional
limitation on the jurisdiction of this Court to 'cases' and 'con-
troversies.' . . . Apart from the jurisdictional requirement, this
Court has developed a complementary rule of self-restraint for its
own governance (not always clearly distinguished from the consti-
tutional limitation) which ordinarily precludes a person from chal-
lenging the constitutionality of state action by invoking the rights
of others."
A typical example of state liberality and federal strictness with
respect to standing is Doremus v. Board of Education.313 Despite
"jurisdictional doubts," the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld
308. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433,445 (1939).
309. 307 U. S. at page 465.
310. 326 U. S. 295 (1945).
311. See pages 411-412, above.
312. 346 U. S. 249, 255 (1953).
313. 342 U. S. 429 (1952).
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the plaintiffs' standing and held that requiring Bible reading in the
public schools was constitutional. One plaintiff was "a citizen and
taxpayer of the State of New Jersey and of the Township of
Rutherford," and the other was the parent of a daughter who had
graduated from the school. The Supreme Court held that neither
plaintiff had standing to raise the constitutional issue, and dis-
missed the appeal. 314 The Court discussed the standing problem in
terms of presence or absence of "a justiciable case or controversy."
The parent lacked standing because the daughter had graduated
and because "this Court does not sit to decide arguments after events
have put them to rest."31 5 The taxpayer lacked standing because it
was not "a good-faith pocketbook action. It is apparent that the
grievance which it is sought to litigate here is not a direct dollars-
and-cents injury but is a religious difference. 3 1 6 The Court did not
mention Heimt v. McCall, 17 in which the Court passed upon the
merits of a constitutional issue in a suit by a taxpayer even though
the suit was not a "pocketbook action."318
Furthermore, the Court did not explain in the Doremus opinion
why the taxpayer could not be regarded as a representative of the
public interest, in the same way that the Supreme Court regarded
the broadcasting station in the Sanders case as a representative of
the public interest.3'0 The public interest in enforcement of the
First Amendment ought to be as strong as the public interest in
enforcement of the Communications Act. The reality is, of course,
that the Heint case was 1915, before the Supreme Court had created
314. The dismissal of the appeal probably has the effect of preventing
the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in favor of constitutionality
under the Federal Constitution from having final effect either as res judicata
or as stare decisis. Indeed, the Court said in the Doreinus opinion that "we
cannot accept as the basis for review, nor as the basis for conclusive disposi-
tion of an issue of federal law without review, any procedure which does not
constitute" a case or controversy. 342 U. S. at page 434. Compare Fidelity
National Bank & Trust Co. v. Swope, 274 U. S. 123 (1927). But compare
Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Moore, 333 U. S. 541, 549-550 (1948).
315. 342 U. S. at page 433.
316. 342 U. S. at page 434.
317. 239 U. S. 175 (1915).
318. In Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, 486 (1923), the Court
said that standing of a municipal taxpayer to prevent misuse of municipal
moneys "is the rule of this court." The Court cited Crampton v. Zabriskie,
101 U. S. 601, 609 (1879). But these cases were "pocketbook" cases.
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1 (1947) upheld standing of
a taxpayer to challenge constitutionality of public support of transportation
to parochial schools, but the taxpayer was seeking to reduce the expenditure.
McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203 (1948), and Zorach
v. Clauson, 343 U. S. 306 (1952) upheld the standing of plaintiffs who were
both taxpayers and parents of school children.
319. FCC v. Sanders Brothers, 309 U. S. 470 (1940), fully discussed
above with the sequel cases at pages 363-369.
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the present artificial law of standing, and that the Supreme Court
has not yet chosen to extend the Sanders doctrine beyond the field
of the Federal Communications Commission. Yet the Court has
never stated any reason why the Sanders doctrine should be limited
to the communications field, and the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit has at least twice taken a strong position that it
should not.3 2
0
The Court in the Doremus case did not even attempt to answer
the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Justices
Reed and Burton concurred: "New Jersey can fashion her own
rules governing the institution of suits in her courts. If she wants
to give these taxpayers the status to sue . . . I see nothing in the
Constitution to prevent it. And where the clash of interests is as
real and as strong as it is here, it is odd indeed to hold that there
is no case or controversy within the meaning of Art. III, § 2 of
the Constitution."132
1
On the same day the Doremus case was handed down, the Court
announced its decision in Adler v. Board of Education,22 uphold-
ing the constitutionality of New York's Feinberg Law in a suit by
parents and teachers. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in dissent asserted
vigorously that the problem of standing of the teachers was con-
trolled by United Public Workers v. Mitchell,3 23 which held that
federal employees could not challenge validity of the Hatch Act
before it had been applied in an enforcement proceeding. But the
majority of the Court in the Adler case ignored the problem of
standing and dealt only with the merits. Whether the reason is
that the Mitchell case originated in a federal court and the Adler
case originated in a state court, or whether the Mitchell case is
320. Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F. 2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943), dis-
missed as moot 320 U. S. 707 (1943) ; Reade v. Ewing, 205 F. 2d 630 (2d
Cir. 1953).
321. 342 U. S. at page 436.
In support of the dissenting position is Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co.
v. Moore, 333 U. S. 541 (1948). A New York statute required insurance
companies to pay to the state all unclaimed benefits under policies issued by
companies doing business in New 'York for delivery in New York on lives of
residents of New York. Nine companies sought a declaration and an injunc-
tion. The Court reasoned: "The [New York] Court of Appeals refused to
accept appellants' arguments for kivalidation of the law on federal constitu-
tional or any other grounds. This decision compelled the appellants to com-
ply ... unless this Court reviewed the federal constitutional issues and de-
cided them in appellants' favor. Consequently a case or controversy . . . is
here." 333 U. S. at page 550.
The decision of the New Jersey courts in the Doremus case was binding
upon the taxpayer plaintiff on the question of constitutionality of Bible read-
ing in the public schools, unless the Supreme Court reviewed and decided
in the plaintiff's favor.
322. 342 U. S. 485 (1952).
323. 330 U. S. 75 (1947).
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otherwise distinguishable, or whether the Mitchell case is over-
ruled or superseded, the Court did not bother to state. The rules
the Court has invented for its own guidance are thus seemingly
violated without explanation..
After the Court's strong insistence in Doremus that a state tax-
payer lacks standing in a case which is not a "pocketbook action,"
the Court later the same year decided the merits of a constitutional
issue in Wieman v. Updegraff,324 in which "a citizen and taxpayer"
sued in an Oklahoma court to enjoin payment of compensation to
employees who had not taken a loyalty oath prescribed by statute.
Since the compensation of employees of the state is the same whether
or not the employees have taken the loyalty oath, the suit was not
a "pocketbook action." But the Court had nothing to say about
the problem of standing, thus in effect reverting to the 1915 view
in the Heim case.32 5
That the Supreme Court is either unwilling or unable to follow
a consistent body of principles on the law of standing when cases
come up from the state courts is abundantly demonstrated. Of all
the state and federal judges in the country, the six in the majority
in the Doremus case are a tiny minority. If the Supreme Court
would cast off the artificialities of its doctrine of standing and revert
to the more natural position of most of the state courts, the Court
would then find easier the achievement of a consistent practice. As
it is, the litigant cannot know in advance whether the Supreme
Court will take a strict position on the problem of standing, as in
Doremus 3- and Mitchell,2 7 or whether the Court will simply ig-
nore the rules it has invented for its own guidance, as in Adlere 2s
and T'ienZan -.32
§ 18. A BRIEF CRITIQUE OF THE LAw OF STANDING
A careful examination of the federal and state law of standing
leads to the conclusion that a very simple and natural proposition
is entirely sound: One who is in fact adversely affected by govern-
324. 344 U. S. 183 (1952).
325. A possible explanation of the Wieinan case is that employees who
had not taken the oath intervened, and "also sought a mandatory injunction
directing the state officers to pay their salaries regardless of their failure
to take the oath." Perhaps if the plaintiff "citizen and taxpayer" lacked
standing, the employees had standing. The weaknesses of this explanation
are that (1) the Court did not mention it, and (2) the Court decided not
only the cross-action by the employees but also the original injunction suit
by the citizen and taxpayer.
326. Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 429 (1952).327. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 331 U. S. 75 (1947).
328. Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 485 (1952).
329. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183 (1952).
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mental action should have steanding to challenge that action if it is
judicially reviewable.
This simple and natural proposition has full support in the
Administrative Procedure Act, which in section 10(a) provides for
review upon petition of "any person ... adversely affected." Com-
mittee reports of both House and Senate explained: "This sub-
section confers a right of review upon any person adversely affected
in fact ...
The simple and natural proposition finds much greater support
in state law than in the law developed by the Supreme Court of
the United States. The law of the Supreme Court is both needlessly
complex and needlessly artificial. The Supreme Court has recently
called its law of standing a "complicated specialty of federal juris-
diction."33' 1 The Court is right that the complications are a specialty
of federal jurisdiction and taat the complications are largely un-
known to state law. But the problems of standing that come to the
state courts are intrinsically no easier than the problems of stand-
ing that come to the federal courts. The difference is that the
federal courts have invented a law of standing that is too complex
for the federal courts to apply consistently,3 32 whereas the state
courts, relatively speaking, have perceived the merits of the simple
proposition that those who are in fact adversely affected should be
allowed to challenge.
The federal courts cannot justify their law of standing by say-
ing that the "case" or "controversy" requirement of Article III of
the Constitution requires the artificiality and the complexity. Noth-
ing in the Constitution--except what the Supreme Court has put
there-requires a departure from the simple and natural proposi-
tion that one who is in fact adversely affected by governmental
action should have standing to challenge that action if it is judicial-
ly reviewable. Whenever a private party who is in fact adversely
affected asserts that administrative action is illegal, and whenever
the defendant in the proceeding asserts that the action is legal, the
technical requirement of "controversy" is met. This is what the
Supreme Court itself has held in the Sanders case. 3 3 What is need-
ed is a consistent application of the Sanders doctrine.
330. Sen. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 212,276 (1946).
331. United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U. S. 153, 156 (1953).
332. Contrast Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 485 (1952) with
United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U. S. 75 (1947) ; contrast Doremus
v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 429 (1952), with Wieman v. Updegraff,
344 U. S. 183 (1952) ; contrast Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510(1925) with Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U. S. 44 (1943).
333. FCC v. Sanders Brothers, 309 U. S. 470 (1940).
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The doctrine of "private attorney generals," as developed in the
Second Circuit,334 permits an adversely affected private party to
assert the public interest in challenging administrative action, when-
ever a statute provides for challenge by one who is "aggrieved," or
"adversely affected." This doctrine provides great potentiality for
movement in the right direction if the Supreme Court will con-
sistently follow it, especially since the Administrative Procedure
Act supplies the statutory basis for the doctrine whenever that Act
is applicable. The Supreme Court itself laid the foundation for the
doctrine in the Sanders case.
In several prominent cases, the Supreme Court has failed to
observe an important distinction-the distinction between standing
to institute a proceeding or to start the judicial machinery in
motion, and standing of one who is already properly a party to a
judicial proceeding to call to the court's attention something that
the court may properly do on its own motion. In the Barrows
case,38 5 the only problem of standing was of the latter type, so that
the many cases dealing with problems of the former type were all
easily distinguishable, but neither the eight justices of the majority
nor the single dissenting justice recognized that fact.
On the problem of whether one party has standing to institute
a judicial proceeding to assert the constitutional or other rights of
another, the Supreme Court has decided both ways. In the out-
standing Pierce case,33 6 a parochial school was allowed to assert the
constitutional rights of parents and of children. But in the Tileston
case, 337 a physician was denied standing to assert the constitutional
rights of his patients. When the Administrative Procedure Act is
applicable, one who is adversely affected in fact should be allowed
to challenge governmental action even though the rights asserted
are those of others.338
The Supreme Court's doctrine that a federal taxpayer has no
standing to challenge the legality of a federal expenditure but that
a municipal taxpayer has standing to challenge the legality of a
municipal expenditure rests principally upon the idea, which had
334. Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F. 2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943), dis-
missed as moot 320 U. S. 707 (1943) ; Reade v. Ewing, 205 F. 2d 630 (2d
Cir. 1953).
335. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U. S. 249 (1953).
Another case where the distinction would have been especially helpful
is NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U. S. 322 (1951).
336. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925).
337. Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U. S. 44 (1943).
338. This proposition is inconsistent with some of the cases but it is
in conformity with (a) the clear legislative history of the APA (see note 1




a good deal of plausibility when the doctrine was enunciated in
1923, that a federal taxpayer's interest is too "minute.' '3 9 Now
that federal taxes take about half of all corporate income, and now
that individual corporations pay federal taxes of up to a billion
dollars a year or more, the 1923 idea is contrary to the plain facts.
Despite the great prestige of the Supreme Court, and despite
the prominence of that Court's decision in Frothinyham v. Mel-
lov,34 the state courts have almost uniformly held that state tax-
payers have standing to challenge state expenditures, even though
no state taxpayer could conceivably have a stake in state expendi-
tures as large as that of our large corporations in federal expendi-
tures.
Indeed, many state courts have gone much further than merely
to allow those who are in fact adversely affected to challenge gov-
ernmental action. State decisions are numerous which recognize
the standing of "citizens," or "residents," or of taxpayers whose
taxes are not affected by the challenged action. Those who imagine
that opening the judicial doors to such cases will cause a flood of
actions by crackpots and officious intermeddlers will do well to
examine the decisions in such states as New York, New Jersey, and
Massachusetts.3 41
Despite the Supreme Corrt's artificialities, some of the lower
federal courts have developed their own sensible ideas about keep-
ing the judicial doors open to parties who are adversely affected in
fact. Outstanding cases uphold the standing of a coal association,
of a labor union of coal miners, and of a railway labor union to
challenge the grant of a certificate to construct a natural gas pipe-
line ;342 uphold the standing of competitors to challenge an award
of subsidies ;343 and uphold the standing of a consumer to challenge
an order permitting use without disclosure on the label of synthetic
sources of vitamin A in oleomargarine.
344
Of all the federal and state judges in the country, the judges of
the majority of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
many extreme cases denying standing are only a tiny minority.
339. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923).
340. Ibid.
341. See the review of these cases in section 11, above.
342. National Coal Ass'n v. FPC, 191 F. 2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
343. American President Lires v. Federal Maritime Board, 112 F. Supp.
346 (D.C. 1953).
344. Reade v. Ewing, 205 F. 2d 630 (2d Cir. 1953).
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